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In this paper a new method of model-theoretic forcing is developed for the 
infinitary language LA(::!) where A is a countable fragment and "::!x" is a new 
quantifier that is read as "there are few x." In particular we will be interested in 
the case where ::!x is interpreted as "there are at most countably many x." In this 
case we will write the quantifier as ::! 1x. 
The method of forcing that we develop is an extension of Abraham Robinson's 
finite forcing for first-order model theory. Our main result is the Standard-
Generic Model Theorem. This theorem allows us to build uncountable standard 
models (models in which "::!x" is actually interpreted as "there are at most 
countably many x") from a given class of models by the forcing construction. By 
examining the forcing construction more carefully we prove a new omitting types 
theorem for countable fragments LA(::!1) of Lw,w(::!1). This new omitting types 
theorem improves a result of Keisler [10]. 
A. major advantage of the forcing construction is that we can restrict our 
attention to formulas of low complexity. For example if we begin with the basic 
formulas of L we obtain a new basic omitting types theorem for L(::!1) that only 
refers to formulas of the form (Sx) 1\m<n'Pm where each 'Pm is basic and Sx is a 
finite string of quantifiers of the form Ox; and 3xj. We can also restrict our 
attention to other subsets of formulas of LA(::!) and obtain similar results. 
When we are working with the language LA(::!) it is convenient to define another 
quantifier, Ox, from ::!x by having Oxcp abbreviate 1::!xcp. Traditionally the model 
theory of this language has been looked at from the point of view that Ox is the 
fundamental new quantifier, and the language has been denoted by LA(O). While 
the difference in point of view is obviously not crucial, we believe there are good 
reasons for looking at this language as being built from ::!x as opposed to Ox, so 
we adopt this convention in this paper. 
Generalized quantifiers were first studied by Mostowski [16], who raised several 
questions about the compactness and completeness of various logics obtained by 
adding new types of quantifiers. In example (d) of his paper, Mostowski defines 
the quantifier ::!1x which he denotes as P. Fuhrken [9] proved the compactness 
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theorem for L(::l 1). The method by which he accomplished this was essentially by 
translating each formula of L(::11) into a formula of a larger language L' 2 L, 
working with first-order model theory on models of L', and then translating back 
into L(::l 1). Similarly Vaught [20] showed that the set of all valid sentences of L(::l 1) 
is a recursively enumerable set. Then in Keisler [1 0] the completeness theorem 
for L(::l 1) was proved with the following very simple set of axiom s<;hemes: 
::lx(x = y v x = z ), 
V x ( cp --7 t/J) --7 (::lxt/f --7 ::lxcp ), 
::lxcp(x) --7 ::lycp(y) where y does not occur in cp(x), 
V x ::I yep A ::lx 3 yep --7 ::ly 3xcp, 
Ox(x = x). 
Other important results m Keisler's paper include a completeness theorem for 
Lw
1
w(::l 1) and an omitting types theorem for L(::11). 
The method of forcing in set theory was invented by Paul Cohen [8] to show 
the independence of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. Abraham 
Robinson [17] later adapted this technique of constructing models to the model 
theory of finitary first-order logic. Barwise [1] extended Robinson's method to 
infinitary logic and used it to give a new proof of the Omitting Types Theorem. 
Keisler [11] gave a general treatment of forcing in Lw,w which included Robin-
son's forcing, Cohen's forcing, and the Omitting Types Theorem. The basis for 
the treatment here of forcing is Keisler's definition of forcing property, a 
generalization of the consistency properties of Makkai. See Keisler [11], Robin-
son [17, 18, 19], Barwise and Robinson [2], and Macintyre.[15] for examples of 
results obtained using finite forcing in the model theory of first-order logic. 
Since the key to the construction of standard models of L(::l1) in [10] is an 
omitting types argument, it was hypothesized by Keisler and Barwise that a 
method of forcing could be developed for the language L(::l1). 
Krivine and McAloon [14] have developed a notion of forcing for languages 
with generalized quantifiers. Their notion of forcing essentially depends upon 
coding formulas of the form Oxcp by atomic formulas, Raw' and defining forcing 
for formulas of this form as for other atomic formulas. 
In this paper we develop a more faithful extension of finite forcing to the 
language LA(::I). This method is not based on the coding of formulas with 
generalized quantifiers as atomic formulas. As one would hope, this new method 
of constructing models of LA(=:I1) leads to new insights in the model theory of 
LA(::I1). For example one new result that is obtained is the improved version of the 
omitting types theorem for LA(::I1) mentioned earlier. 
In Section 1 we introduce our notation and define the three types of models 
that we will be interested in: the weak, ideal, and standard models of LA(::I). We 
also show that ideal models are preserved under unions of chains and derive some 
consequences that will be used in later chapters. 
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In Section 2 the new definitions of forcing and forcing properties for LA(::!) are 
given. The main result of this chapter is the Standard-Generic Model Theorem. 
Section 3 is concerned with a more careful examination of formulas preserved 
under forcing. The new 0-0mitting Types Theorem is derived and an application 
to ordered fields is given. 
This paper is a revised version of the first three chapters of the author's 
doctoral dissertation [ 4] completed at the University of Wisconsin in 1975 under 
Professor H. Jerome Keisler. We would like to take this opportunity to thank him 
and Professor K. Jon Barwise for their help and encouragement during the 
author's years as a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin. 
1. Introduction to ideal and standard models 
In this section we will describe the syntax and semantics for the language LA(::!). 
We define and give axioms corresponding to the three types of models we will be 
interested in: weak models, ideal models, and standard models of LA(::!). We.also 
prove some fundamental results on chains of models that will be used in the 
following chapters. 
We follow the usual terminology and notation for the model theory of first-
order logic. See Chang and Keisler [7] for details. We start with the notion of a 
first-order language L with equality symbol,. =, and possibly other relation 
symbols, R, S, ... ; function symbols g, h, ... ; and constant symbol a, b, c, .... 
Terms and forqmlas of L are built up in the usual way from the symbols of L, 
variables, and the logical symbols -,, v, and 3. v, w, x, y, and z will denote 
variables, while v, w, x, y, and z denote finite strings of variables. If the length of 
x is n we will often write x as x1 x2 • • • xn. 
A model ~ for L is a tuple of the form 
where A is a non-empty set and each R~t, fw., a\ll, etc. is the interpretation of the 
corresponding symbol of the language L. We will denote models by~. \8, (;£, ... , 
and the corresponding base sets by A, B, C, .... a, b, ... will denote finite strings 
of elements of a model. Rather than keeping careful track of the lengths of finite 
strings of variables or elements of models, we will assume that the lengths of the 
strings correspond where necessary. For example if cp(x) is a formula and we write 
~l=<.p[a], then the lengths of x and a will be assumed to be the same. 
Ordinals will be denoted by lower case Greek letters a, (3, y, A, .... We identify 
each ordinal with the set of smaller ordinals, and the cardinals with the initial 
ordinals. w will denote the first infinite cardinal; w"' will denote the ath uncounta-
ble cardinal. If X is a set, then lXI denotes the cardinality of X, S(X) denotes the 
set of all subsets of X, and xn the set of all n-tuples of elements of X. We assume 
the axiom of choice throughout. 
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Let us begin our study by defining the syntax of the language L(::l). Let L be a 
first-order language with equality symbol, =. and a countable list of relation 
symbols, function symbols, and individual constant symbols. We will assume 
throughout this paper that L is count-able. We form the language L(::l) by adding 
to L a new quantifier ::lx, which is read "there are few x." The set of formulas of 
L(::l) is the least set <P which contains all of the atomic formulas of L and has the 
property: 
If 'fl, t/J E <P and y is a variable, then 'P v t/J, 1 <p, 3y<p, and ::ly<p E <P. 
Sentences are formulas without free variables, and theories are sets of sen-
tences. 
The infinitary language Lw,w(::l) is built from L(::l) by also closing under the 
infinite disjunction, V <P or V <pE<P'P, of a countable set of formulas. The symbols 
1\ , 1\, --7, V, Q and 6 are regarded as abbreviations, 
<p/\tfi for l(l<pVIt/J), 
1\ </J for I v ,PE<P I(/), 
'P --7 !f! for 1 'P v t/J, 
Vx<p for 131<p, 
Ox<p for I::IX'fl, 
Ox<p for ::lx 1 'P· 
The quantifiers Ox and Ox are read "there are many x" and "for most x" 
respectively. 
An important concept is the notion of a subformula of a formula of Lw,w (::1). We 
will often prove results by induction on the complexity of formulas. 
Definition. For each formula 'P of Lw,w(::l), the set sub (<p) of sub-formulas of 'Pis 
defined by recursion as follows: If 'P is atomic, 
sub (<p) ={<p}, 
sub ('P v t/J) =sub (<p) Usub (t/J) U{<p v t/1}, 
sub ( I'P) =sub ('P) U { l<p}, 
sub (3x<p) =sub ( 'P) U {3x<p}, 
sub(V<P)=U"'E<Psub(<p)U{V<P}, 
sub (::lx<p) =sub ( I'P) U {::lx<p }. 
It is convenient to let 1 'P be a subformula of ::lx<p for some proofs and definitions 
by induction. It is easy to see that sub ( 'P) is at most countable for any formula of 
Lw,w(::l). 
The language Lw,w(::l) has uncountably many formulas and hence is too large to 
work with for most purposes. A more convenient language for studying the model 
theory of these formulas is a "nice" countable subset of the language Lw,w (::1). 
Recall that given a formula <p(x) and a term T, 'P( T) is obtained by replacing each 
free occurrence of x in <p(x) by T. 
Definition. A set LA(::I) of formulas of Lw,w(::l) is a fragment iff 
(1) Every formula of L(::l) belongs to LA(::I). 
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(2) LA(::!) is closed under 1, 3x, ::lx, and finite disjunctions. 
(3) If cp(x)EL(::I) and Tis a term, then cp(T)ELA(::I). 
(4) If cp E LA(::!), then every subformula of cp belongs to LA(::!). 
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(5) If VIPELA(::I) and BELA(::!), then v'f'E<P(Ovcp), v'f'Eq,icp, v'f'Eq,3Xcp, and 
V "'E<P::Ixcp all belong to LA (::1). 
Note that the sets of formulas L(::l) and Lw
1
w (::I) are fragments. Also note that 
for every set 1ft of formulas of Lw
1
w (::1), there is a least fragment LA(::!) containing 
1ft. If 1ft is countable, so is the least fragment containing it. From now on we shall 
assume that LA(::!) is a countable fragment. 
We will be interested in three different categories of models for the language 
LA(::!): weak models, ideal models, and standard models. 
A weak model for LA(::!) is a pair (21, f) where 21 is a model for the first-order 
language L and f is a set of subsets of the universe A of 21, i.e. f s: S(A). The 
notion of an n-tuple a.t> ... , a., E A satisfying a formula cp(v 1, ••• , v.,) in (21, f) is 
defined in the usual way by induction on the complexity of cp, and is denoted by 
(~l, f)l=cp[a 1 , ••• , a,.]. The ::lx clause in the definition is: 
(~l, f) I= ::lxcp[at> ... , a,.] iff {bE A: (21, f) I= cp[b, a 1 , ... , a,.]} Ef. 
There are many types of relations between weak models that we will be 
interested in. 
Definition. We define the binary relations =, = q,, and <q, between model as 
follows: 
(21, f)= (~l', f) iff there is an isomorphism F between the models 21 and 21' such 
for any s s: A, s E f iff F(s) E f'. 
(21, f)= q,(\B,f') iff for each sentence cp E IP, (21, f) I= cp iff (\B, f')l= cp. 
(~l,f)<q,(\B,f') iff 21s: m and for each cp(x)EIP and aEA", (21,f)l=cp[a] iff 
(\B,f')l= cp[a]. 
Given a weak model (21, f) for LA(::!), we denote by (~l*, f) the model obtained 
by adding a new constant symbol ii for each a E A and interpreting ii in (21*, f) by 
a. We denote by L!_(::l) the language obtained by adding these constants to LA(::l). 
A weak model has the minimal amount of structure necessary for the quantifier 
::lx to make sense. In actual practice, however, a stronger notion of model is more 
useful. 
Definition. We say a weak model (21, f) is an ideal model iff f is a non-trivial 
non-principal ideal of subsets of A, i.e. f s: S(A), and if s, t E f, then 
(i) S U t E f, 
(ii) ifu s: s, then u E f, 
(iii) A~ f, 
(iv) for each a E A, {a} E f. 
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It is from this notion of ideal model that we get our interpretation of ::lx as 
"there are few x." The next theorem gives a syntactic characterization of ideal 
models. 
Definition. We say a set ss;A is definable in (~l,f) if s={aEA: (~,f)l=<p(a,b)} 
for some <p (x, y) of LA (::I) and b E A''. Def (~l, f)= { s s; A : s is definable in (~, f)}. 
Theorem 1.1. Let (~l, f) be a weak model of LA(::!) and let f' be the ideal generated 
by fn Def (~1, f). Then 
( 1) (~l, f')<LA<o~J(~l, f) and (~l, f') is an ideal model iff 
(2) (~l, f) satisfies the universal closures of the following axioms: 
(IO): All of the axiom schemes for LA. 
(Il): Ox (x = x). 
(12): ::lx (x = y). 
(13): V x ( <p ~ l{i) ~ (::lx l{i ~ ::lx <p ). 
(14): ::lx<p(x)~::ly<p(y) whenever y is free for x in <p(x). 
(IS): ::lx<p(x);dx!{i(x)~::lx (<pv!{i). 
Proof. (I ::} 2) Recall that (~l, f) <LA(o~)(~l, f') means that for all formulas <p(x) of 
LA(::!) and finite strings of elements a from A,(~, f')l=<p[a] iff(~, f)l=<p[a]. We will 
verify that each of the axioms holds in (~,f). 
(IO): Obviously (~,f) satisfies all the axiom schemes for LA-
(11): Since f' is a non-trivial ideal, Ai f'. Therefore (~, f')I=Qx(x = x) and 
thus (~l, f)I=Qx(x = x). 
(12): For all aEA, {a}Ef'. Therefore (~,f')l=::lx(x=a) and so does (~l,f). 
(13): Suppose (~,f)I=Vx(<p~!{i)A::lx!{i(x). Therefore if s</l={aEA:(~,f)l= 
l{i[ a]} and s"' = {a E A: (~1, f) I= 'P[ a]} then s"' s; s</1, and s</1 E f and hence E f'. Since f' is 
an ideal, s"' E f' and (~1, f')l=::lx <p(x). Therefore (~,f) l=::lx <p(x). 
(14): This holds in any weak model of LA(::!). We include this axiom solely 
for completeness. 
(IS): If (~1, f) I= ::lx <p (x) 1\ ::lx !{i(x) then s"', s</1 E f and hence E f'. Therefore since 
f' is an ideal, s"'v</l=s"'Us</IEf'. As in (13) we get (~,f)l=::lx(<pv!{i). 
(2::} 1) We must show two things: (1) (~1, f') <LA(o~)(~l, f), and (2) f' is a non-
trivial non-principal ideal. 
We first show (~l, f') <LA<o~J(~l, f) by induction on the complexity of formulas. The 
only step presenting any difficulty is for <p of the form :lx l{i(x ). Since f' contains all 
of the definable sets of f it is clear that (~l, f)l=::lx !{i(x) implies (~. f')l=::lx l{i(x). 
Suppose (~1, f')l=::lx l{i(x). Since f' is generated by the definable sets of f we must 
have s</1 s; s"'' U · · · Us"'" for some <p 1, ••• , 'Pn of LA(::!), such that 
(~, f)l=:lx<p 1(x)A · · · 1\:IX<pn(x). 
But by (IS) and induction, 
(~, f)l=::lx (<p 1(x)v · · · v<pn(x)). 
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Let O(x) be cp 1 v · · · v 'Pn· Therefore s"' £ s6 E f. But s"' c;; s8 implies (~,f) I= 
'Vx (1/f(x)- O(x)). Also(~, f)l=::lx O(x), so by axiom (13), ('21, f)l=::lx 1/f(x). Therefore 
(~,f) <LA(,j)(~, f'). 
We now show that f' is a non-trivial non-principal ideal. f' is an ideal by 
definition. Since (11) holds in ('21, f), it holds in ('21, f'). Therefore A~f'. Since (12) 
holds in (\ll, f), it also holds in ('21, f'). Thus for any a E A, {a} Ef'. Therefore f' is 
non-principal. 
It is easy to prove completeness and compactness theorems for ideal models 
using axioms (10)-(15). 
The third class of models that we will be interested in are the standard models. 
Definition. We say that a weak model ('21, f) is a standard model of LA(::It) if 
IAI ~ w 1 and f = {s c;; A: lsi~ w }. If (\ll, f) is a standard model we will generally omit 
the f and simply refer to the standard model '21. 
In a standard model the interpretation of ::lx is equivalent to "'there are at most 
countably many x"; that of Ox is "'there exist uncountably many," and that of Ox 
is "'for all but countably many x." 
The central theorem in Keisler [10] is a proof of the completeness theorem for 
standard models of L(::11) with the following axioms: 
(AO)-(A5): Same as (I0)-(15) for ideal models. 
(A6): 'Vx::lycpA::Ix3ycp-::ly3xcp. 
If LA(::I1) is a fragment of Lw,w(::l1 )"the axioms are: 
(AO)-(A6): as above. 
(A7): 1\<P- cp for each cpE <P. 
(A8): V <P ~ 1/\.,E<P icp. 
(AY): 1\.,E<P::Ix cp- :IX V <P. 
When we speak of axiom systems for L(::l) or LA(:!) we will always be speaking 
with reference to the rules of inference (RO) and (Rl) below for L(::l), and (RO), (Rl), 
and (R2) for LA(:!): 
(RO) (Modus Ponens): From cp, cp- 1/J, infer 1/J. 
(Rl) (Generalization): From cp, infer 'Vx cp. 
(R2) (Infinitary Conjunction): From 1/J- cp for all cp E <P, infer cp- A <P. 
Equivalent forms of axioms (A3 ), (A6), and (AY) that will be useful are: 
(A3)': Vx (cp- 1/1)- (Ox cp- Ox 1/J), 
(A6)': Oy 3x cp- 3x Oy cp vOx 3y cp, 
(AY)': Ox ( V <P)- V <pE<POx cp. 
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The axioms have the following intended interpretation: 
(A 1): The universe of the model is uncountable. 
(A2): One is countable. 
(A3 ): Any subset of a countable set is countable. 
(A6): A countable union of countable sets is countable. 
(A Y): A countable union of countable sets is countable. 
It is easy to see that all standard models satisfy (AO)-(A9). Of course not all 
weak models of axioms (AO)-(A6) will be standard models. For example for any 
model ~I of L, if we let f be the set of all finite subsets of A then (~,f) will satisfy 
(AOHA6). 
Actually Keisler used a slightly different axiomatization that is equivalent to 
(AO)-(A9) above. In this axiomatization (A2) is replaced by ::lx (x==yvx==z) and 
(AS) does not appear. Keisler [10, pp. 8-12] shows that our axiom (AS) is 
provable from his axioms. The rest of the proof of the equivalence of the two sets 
of axioms for L(::l 1 ) is easy. We have chosen this slightly different axiomatization 
to emphasize the fact that the axioms for L(::l 1) contain those for ideal models. 
To avoid confusion between the axioms (10)-(IS) and (AO)-(A9) we will adopt 
the following terminology: 
Conventions. ( l) We shall say that (~,f) is an ideal model of LA(::l) if (~1, f) 
satisfies (10)-(IS). On the other hand we shall say (~,f) is a model of LA(::l1) if 
(~1, f) satisfies (AOHA9). (We shall say (~,f) is a model of L(::l1) if (~,f) satisfies 
(AO)-(A6).) 
(2) We write Tl-.:p if .:p is provable from T and the axioms (10)-(IS). We write 
Tl- 1.:p if .:p is provable from T and (AO)-(A9). Tis consistent in LA(::l) means there 
is no formula .:p of LA(::l) such that Tl-.:pA 1.:p. Similarly Tis consistent in LA(::l1) 
means there is no formula .:p of LA(::l) such that Tl- 1.:pA1.:p. 
The following lemma shows that certain formulas are provable. 
Lemma 1.2. (Keisler) Let .:p, 1.{1 be formulas, and x, y distinct variables of LA(::l). 
(i) 1-'v'xl.:p---?::lx.:p. 
(ii) l-3x Oy .:p---? Oy3x .:p. 
(iii) If x does not occur free in .:p, then l-Ox (.:p !\ 1.{1)---? .:p !\Ox 1.{1. 
(iv) l-Ox AOXI.{I---?Ox (.:pAl.{!). 
(v) l-Ox O(x) !\ 1.{1---? Ox (O(x) !\ 1.{1) if x does not occur in 1.{1. 
A proof of this lemma may be fourid in Keisler [10]. 
By the way we have written the axioms for LA(::ld it is clear that all theorems of 
LA (::l) are also theorems of LA (::l1 ). Of course the converse is not true. For 
example let L = { <, R} and ~I= (w 2 , E, R~1 ) where R~1 (n, a) iff n < w and a= 
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w · n. Let f be the set of all bounded subsets of w 2 . Since f is an ideal, (~,f) is an 
ideal model and thus satisfies (10)-(15). Let cp(x, y) be the formula: 
3z(R(x, z) 1\ y < z ). Intuitively cp(x, y) says y is less than w · x. Then (~,f) I= 
V x :::ly cp(x, y) since if x;?:: w there is no y such that cp(x, y ), while otherwise only 
y < w · x will work. Also (\ll, f)l=:::lx 3y cp(x, y) since only x < w have corresponding 
y's. However (\ll, f)l=ay 3x cp(x, y) (in fact) (~, f)I=Vy 3x cp(x, y)) since every ele-
ment is less than some w · n. Thus (\ll, f) ltV x :::ly cp 1\ ::lx 3y cp ~ :::ly 3x cp. Therefore 
V x :::ly cp 1\ ::lx 3y cp ~ :::ly 3x cp is not provable from (10)-(15). 
There are several advantages to studying ideal models of LA(::!). One of these is 
that many of the models of interest for the language LA(::!) are ideal models. For 
example let \ll be any model of L and K an infinite cardinal less than or equal to 
the cardinality of A. Then if we let f = {s c:; A: is\< K}, (~,f) will be an ideal 
model. On the other hand, axiom (A6) will be valid in all models (~,f) for f as 
defined above if and only if K is regular. Another reason for studying ideal models 
is that their behavior is nicer model-theoretically than models of (AO)-(A6). For 
example we shall show below that the unioP of a chain of ideal models is an ideal 
model. However, the union of a chain of models of LA(:::l1) is not necessarily a 
model of LA(:::l1). 
We begin our study of ideal models by looking at the notion of sub-model. We 
define the following important classes of formulas. 
Definition. A formula cp of. LA(::!) is a basic formula if cp is an atomic formula or 
the negation of an atomic formula. 
Recall that a primitive formula of LA is one of the form 3y l{;(x, y) where !{; is a 
conjunction of basic formulas. Analogous to this we define the a-primitive 
formulas as follows: 
Definition. A formula cp of LA(::!) is said to be a-primitive if it is of the form 
(Sy)l{;(x, y) where Sy is of the form (S1y 1) • • • (S;;y,) with each Si E{3, a} and!{; a 
conjunction of basic formulas. 
Many of the definitions that we will make for use in the model theory of LA(::!) 
are motivated by looking at what happens in the model theory of LA, and 
replacing basic or primitive formulas by the a-primitive formulas. 
If \ll and~ are standard models of LA(:::l1) such that ~l2 ~. it is easy to show by 
induction that if cp is a-primitive and ~I= cp[a] then ~I= cp[a]. We shall define the 
notion of submodel for ideal models to generalize this. 
Definition. Let (\ll, f) be an ideal model of LA(::!). The a-diagram of (~,f), in 
symbols a-diag (\ll, f), is defined to be {cp[a]: cp(x) is a a-primitive formula of 
LA(::!), a is a finite sequence of elements of A, and (\ll, f)l=cp[a]}. 
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Definition. Let (~l, f) and (?!3, f') be ideal models of LA(::!). We define (~,f)<;; (\8, f') 
iff ~l <;; ?B as models of L and (?!3, f')t=Q-diag (~l, f). 
Definition. A formula if' of LA(::!) will be called quexistential if it is of the form 
(Sy)!/f(x, y) where (Sy) is as before and !/J is a Boolean combination of basic 
formulas. 
Analogous to the fact that existential formulas are preserved in extensions, here 
we have qucxistential formulas preserved under extensions. 
Theorem 1.3. Suppose (~l, f)<;; (\8, f') are ideal models of LA(::!), and ip(X) is a 
quexistential formula. If (~l, f)F(f'[a] where a is a finite string of elements from A, 
then (?!3, f')Fip[a]. 
Proof. The proof is straightforward using axiom (15). 
Definition. If { (~la, fa) : a < A} is a chain of ideal models (i.e. (~la, fa)<;; (~fl' ffl) for 
a< {3 <A), we define the union of the chain, U a<A (~la, fa), to be the model (~l, f) 
where ~l=Ua<A~la and f={s<;;A:3y<A such that for all {3 with y~{3<A, 
s n Afl E ffl}. 
Note that the above definition differs from that given in Keisler [10]. However, 
for elementary chains of models the definitions are equivalent. We now show that 
ideal models are closed under unions of chains. 
Theorem 1.4. Let (~a' fa): a< A} be a chain of ideal models of LA(::!). Then 
(~l, f)= Ua<A (~la, fa) is an ideal model. 
Proof. We show that f is a non-trivial, non-principal ideal. 
(i) Suppose s, t E f. Therefore there are y1 , y2 <A such that y 1 ~ {3 <A implies 
s n Afl E ffl and y2 ~ {3 <A implies t n Afl E ffl. Let y =max (''fl, -y2). Then y ~ {3 <A 
implies s n A(3, t n A(3 E fl3. Since each f(3 is an ideal, 1' ~ {3 <A implies 
(s n Afl) u (t n Afl) = (s u t) n Afl E ffl. 
Therefore s U t E f. 
(ii) Suppose s E f and t <;; s. Therefore there is a y <A such that y ~ {3 <A 
implies s n A(3 E fw Since each f(3 is an ideal, t n A(3 E f(3 for 1' ~ {3 <A. Therefore 
t E f. 
(iii) A E f since Afl E ffl for each {3 <A. 
(iv) For each aEA, {a}Ef since if aEAfl, {a}Effl. D 
The following modification of ·our previous counterexample shows that 
Theorem 1.4 fails for models of L(::l1). 
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Let a 0 , ..• ,an, ... be any listing of w 2 -{w·n:n<w} in type w. Let A 0 = 
{w · n: n < w} and An+ I= An U {aJ for each n < w. Let < be the usual ordering of 
w 2 in type w 2 and let <n be < I An x An for each n. We define the binary 
relation R on w 2 by R(a, {3) iff a< w and {3 = w ·a, and let Rn = R I An X An-
Let ~n =(An, <n, Rn) for each n. Then each ~ln is ordered in type w by <n. For 
each n < w we define fn c:; S(An) by s E fn iff there is an a E An such that for all 
bEs, b<n a (iff sis finite). Let (\>l,f)= Un<w (\>lmfn). Then A=(w 2 , <)is the 
usual ordering in type w 2 , and R~1 is the R defined above. We claim f contains all 
bounded subsets of w 2 • To see this let s c w 2 be bounded and let a< w 2 be a 
bound for s. Let n be such that a E An. Therefore for m ~ n, s n Am E fm since 
b <m a for each bE s. Hence s E f. 
Now if <p(x, y) is the formula 3z (R (x, z) A y < z ), axiom (A6) will fail for <p as 
in the previous counterexample. However, for each n < w, (\>ln, fn) satisfies axioms 
(AO)-(A6) since fn is just the set of all finite subsets of A"" We can also show that 
{(\>ln,fn):n<w} forms a chain of models. We prove this by induction on the 
complexity of 0-primitive formulas. Clearly 
(*) 
for ljJ a conjunction of basic formulas. Suppose (*) holds for ljl(b, a) and (~n' fn)l:= 
3y!jl(y,a). Then there is a bEAn such that (\>ln,fn)l:=!jl[b,a]. By induction 
(~n+l, fn+dF o/[b, a] and hence (~n+l, fn+ 1)F 3y ljl[a]. Suppose (*) holds for ljl[b, a] 
and (\>1"' fn)FOy ljl[a]. By the definition off"' {bE An: (~n' fn)F ljl[b, a]} is infinite. 
Now since fn+l is defined in the same way and 
{bE An: (~ln, fn)F ljl[b, a]} c:; {bE An+ I: (~n+l• fn+l)F o/[b, a]}, 
(\>ln+l• fn+ 1)F0y ljl[a]. Therefore each 0-primitive formula holding m (\>1"' fn) 
holds in (\>ln+l• fn+l), SO (~"' fn) c:; (~n+l• fn+l). 
We have shown that (~,f) is the union of a countable chain of models of L(.::l1) 
but (\>1, f) is not a model of L(.::l1). By theorem 1.4 it is of course an ideal model. 
The following definitions will be important throughout the rest of this paper. 
The first is a generalization of the notion of a 0-primitive formula. 
Definition. Let (/> be a set of formulas of LA(.:!) that is closed under subformulas 
and contains all atomic and negated atomic formulas. $ 5 is defined to be the set 
of all formulas of the form (Sx)l\m<n <pm where (Sx) is a finite string of Ox; 's and 
3xi 's, and each <pm E $. 
Definition. A set of ideal models {(~l"', f"'): a< A} is said to be a $ 5 -elementary 
chain iff for each a < {3 <A, (~"'' f"') < <Ps (~1 13 , f13 ). 
In Section 2 we will use $ 5 -elementary chains of certain types of ideal models 
to construct standard models of LA(.::l1). The following theorem will allow us to 
continue our construction at limit stages. 
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Theorem 1.5. Let cp be a set of formulas of LA(:f) that is closed under subformulas 
and contains all atomic and negated atomic formulas. Let {(2!a, fa): a< A} be a 
cps-elementary chain of ideal models. Let (2!, f)= Ucx<A cmcx, fcx). Then for all Cl' <A, 
(2{cx, fcx) <rp
5 
(2{, f). 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of formulas. The proof is as 
usual for cp atomic or of the form II/I, l/J v e, or 3x l/J(x ). We give the flavor of the 
proof by exhibiting the induction step for formulas of the form :::.lx 1/J(x) where 
::Jx l/J(x) E cps· We must show that for each a< A and a a finite string of elements 
of Acx, (\"'lex, fcx)I=:::Jx l/J(x, a) iff (m, f)I=:::Jx l/l(x, a). Our induction hypothesis is that the 
above statement is true with :::Jx 1/J(x, a) replaced by l/l(b, a) where b is an element 
of Acx. 
( ~) Suppose (mcx, fcx)t=:::Jx l/J(x, a). Therefore since {(m13 , f 13 ): {3 <A} is a cps_ 
elementary chain, for all {3 with a~ {3 <A, (m13 , f 13 )1=:::Jx l/l(x, a). Hence for all {3 
with a~ {3 <A, 
{b"E A(3: cm(3, f(3)1= t/f(b, a)} E fw (1) 
Let s={bEA:(2!,f)l=t/f(b,a)}. We would like to show sEf. By our induction 
hypothesis forb E A 13, {3 ~a, we have (m, f) I= l/l(b, a) iff (m 13, f13 )1= l/l(b, a). Therefore 
s n A 13 ={bE A 13 : em, f) I= l/J(b, a)} 
={bE A 13 : (m, f13 )1= l/l(b, a)}. 
Thus by ( 1), s n A 13 E f13 for all {3 such that a~ {3 <A. Hence s E f and so 
(\"II, f)l=:lx l/J(x, a). 
(¢:)Suppose (2!,f)l=:::.lxl/J(x,a).Let s={bEA:(m,f)l=l/J(b,a)}. Then sEf. By 
definition there is a 'Y <A (with also 'Y ~a) such that for all {3 with 'Y ~ {3 <A, 
s n A 13 E f 13 • As above, by induction we can show 
s n A 13 ={bE A 13 : (m13 , f13 )1= l/J(c, a)}. 
Therefore for 'Y ~ {3 < A, (m 13 , f13 ) I= :::Jx l/J(x, a). But since { (m13, f13 ): {3 <A} is a cps-
elementary chain, (mcx, fcx) <. <Ps (m,., f,.). Hence (mcx, fcx)I=:::Jx 1/f(x, a). D 
The following proposition on conjunctions of formulas of cps will be useful in 
the next section in our study of certain types of forcing properties. 
Proposition 1.6. If cp, l/1 E cps, then there is a (} E cps such that 1- cp 1\ l/J ~ e. 
Sketch of Proof. This proof can be carried out by induction on the total number 
of quantifiers in the prefixes of cp and l/J. The key points are that l-(3x cp 1\ l/J) ~ 
3x (cp 1\ 1/1) and 1-(0x cp 1\ 1/1) ~Ox (cp 1\ l/J) if x does not occur free in l/J. 
In the next few sections we will be studying ideal models that satisfy a certain 
subset of the axioms of LA(:::.l1). 
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Definition. Let cps be defined as above. We say that (m, f) is a cps-good model if 
for each 'P E cps and e E cps such that veE LA(::I) we have: 
(m, f)t=Vx ::1)1 cp A::lx 3y cp ---7 ::ly 3x cp, (1) 
and 
(m, f)t= AeEEJ ::lx (} ---7 ::lx v e, (2) 
i.e., axioms (A6) and (AS) "hold within cps·" 
An important fact is that cps-good models are preserved under unions of 
cps -elementary chains. 
Theorem 1.7. Let [ (m"'' U: a< A} be a cps-elementary chain of cps-good ideal 
models. Then (m, f)= Ua<>.. (m"'; f"') is a cps~good ideal model. 
Proof. By Theorem L5, (m"'' fJ<<Ps (m, f) for each a< A. We still have something 
to prove here though since the formulas.(l) and (2) above need not be in cps· We 
begin by showing the contrapositive of (1) in the definition of cps-good. 
Suppose cp E cps and a is a finite sequence of elements of A such that 
(m, f)t=Oy 3x cp(a]. cp E cps implies Oy 3x cp E cps· Therefore if A"' contains all of 
the elements of the sequence a then (m"'' f"')t=Oy 3x cp[a]. Since (m"'' f"') is 
<Ps-good, (m"'' f"')t=3x Oy cp[a]vOx 3y cp[a]. Suppose (m"'' f"')t=3x Oy cp[a]. By cps_ 
elementarity, (m, f)t=3f Oy cp[a]. Similarly if (m"', f"')t=Ox 3y cp[a] so does (m, f). 
Therefore in either case (m, f)t=3x Oy cp[a]vOx 3y cp[a]. Hence 
(m, f)t= Oy 3x cp[a] ---7 3x Oy cp[a] vOx 3y cp[a]. 
Suppose (~l, f)t= /\IJEEJ ::lx e[a] where e <; <Ps and a is a finite sequence of 
elements of A. (Note that ::lx(J need not be in cps; however, Ox(} will be by the 
definition of cps.) Suppose A"' contains all of the elements of a. Then we claim 
that (m"', f"')t= /\ 6 E0 ::1x e[a]. Suppose not. Then there is a e E e such that (m"', f"')t= 
Oxe[a]. But then (m""f"')<<Ps(~l,f) implies (m,f)t=Oxe[a]. Contradiction! There-
fore for all {3-;;::a, (m 13,f13 )t=/\uEe ::lx(}[a] since a is contained in each m13 • Since 
each (m 13, f13 ) is <Ps-good, (m 13, f13 )t=:::lx V e[a] for each {3-;;:: a. Let s = 
{bE A: (m, f)t= V fJ[b,_a]}. We will show that s n A 13 E f13 for each {3-;;:: a. Let {3 ~a. 
Therefore 
s n A 13 ={bE A13 : (~l, f)t= V e[b, a]} 
={bE A 13 : there is a(} E fJ such that (m, f)t= (}[b, a]} 
= {bE A 13 :there is a (} E fJ such that (~! 13 , f13 )t= (}[b, a]} 
={bE At3: (~l/3, ft3)t=V e[b, a]} 
The third equality above holds since (} E cps and (m 13 , f13 ) <<Ps (m, f). Therefore 
s n A13 ={bE A 13 : (mi3, f13 )t=V fJ[b, a]}. But 
{bE A/3: (m/3, ft3)t= v El[b, a]}E f(3, 
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smcc (W 13 , f13 )t:::lx V fJ[a]. Therefore for each {3 ~a, s n A 13 E fw Hence (~l, f)t: 
::lx v e[a]. It follows that 
(~!, f)t: AoEA ::lx e[a] ~ ::lx v e[a] 
for each e <;;cps with veE LA(::!). Thus (~t, f) is a c}Js-good ideal model. 0 
2. Forcing and the standard-generic model theorem 
In this section we will set up our forcing apparatus and prove the existence of 
standard-generic models. Our discussion of forcing will be patterned after that of 
Keisler [I I]. 
Let LA(::!) be a countable fragment of Lw
1
w(::l). We introduce two countable 
disjoinr sets of new constants, C and D, where D is linearly ordered by > 0 in 
type w. Let K be the first-order language formed by adding the constants CUD 
to L KA(::Ii will denote the set of all formulas obtained from formulas cp of LA(::!) 
by replacing finitely many free variables of cp by constants from CUD. It is easy 
to show that KA(::I) is a fragment of Kw
1
w(::l). The fact that each formula of KA(::I) 
has only finitely many constants from CUD will be important in the definition of 
forcing properties below. 
The models for K have the form (W, ao bd)cEC,dED' where ~l is a model for L, 
each c E C has the interpretation ac E A, and each dE D has the interpretation 
bd E A We say that a model (~l, ao bd)cEC.dED is a canonical model for K iff 
A= {ac: c E C}. In the construction of models by forcing, the constants in C will 
form the base set of the new model. The constants in D perform a special role 
that will be explained later. 
We now introduce the components of our forcing machinery: 
Definition. A forcing property for the language L(::l) is a quadruple P = (P, ,;; , f, g) 
such that: 
(i) (P, ,;; ) is a partially ordered structure with a least element 0. 
(ii) f is a function which associates with each pEP a set f(p) of atomic 
sentences of K. g is a function that associates a subset g(p) of D with each pEP. 
We say d occurs in p if dE g(p). 
(iii) Whenever p,;;q, we have f(p)s;f(q), and g(p)s;g(q). 
(iv) Let a and T be terms of K without variables, and let pEP. Then: 
(a) If (T=a)Ef(p), then (a==T)Ef(q) for some q~p 
(b) If (T=a), cp(T)Ef(p), then cp(a)Ef(q) for some q~p. 
(c) For some cEC and q~p, (c=T)Ef(q). 
(d) Ford, d', distinct elements of D, (d=d')Ef(p). 
(e) If d appears in some cp E f(p ), dE g(p ). 
The elements of P are called conditions of P. The letters p, q, r, s, t, p', q', ... 
will be used to denote conditions. From now on we will write pEP instead of 
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pEP. For pEP, d > p is defined to mean that d is greater than any element of D 
occurring in p (i.e., if d'Eg(p) then d> 0 d'). (Vd>p)cp abbreviates Vd(dED/\ 
d>p--;.cp). 
We are now ready to give the definition of the forcing relation. 
Definition. Let P be a forcing property for L(::l). For pEP we define p If- cp (p 
forces cp) by induction on the complexity of sentences cp E KA(::I) as follows: 
(i) If cp is an atomic sentence then p If- cp iff cp E f(p ). 
(ii) p lf-1cp iff there is no q 3 p such that q If- cp. 
(iii) p If- V C/J iff p If- cp for some cp E C/J. 
(iv) plf-3xcp(x) iff plf-cp(c) for some cEC. 
(v) plf-::lxcp(x) iff plf-1cp(d) for all dED such that d>p. 
Remarks. ( 1) Clauses (i)-(iv) of the above definition are the same as in the 
definition of forcing for L. Clause (v) is new. 
(2) Since ax cp(x) abbreviates 1::lx cp, we have by (ii) and (v) above that 
plf-axcp(x) iff for all q3p there is a d>q and an r3q such that rlf-cp(d). 
(3) The elements of D play the role of "big" elements in our construction. 
Thus p If- 1cp(d) for all d > p means that only a bounded set of the big elements 
will end up satisfying cp in the model constructed. 
We say that p weakly forces cp (written p lf-w cp) iff p If- 11cp. The following 
lemma summarizes some of the basic facts about forcing. 
Lemma 2.1. Let P be a forcing property for L(::l), pEP, and cp E KA(::I). 
(i) p lf-w cp iff for every q 3 p there is a condition r 3 q which forces cp. 
(ii) If p 3 q and p If- cp then q If- cp. 
(iii) It is impossible for both p If- cp and p lf-1 cp to hold. 
(iv) If plf-cp then plf-wcp. 
(v) plf-w-,cp iff plf-1cp. 
(vi) p lf-Vx cp(x) iff for all c E C and q 3 p there is an r 3 q such that rlf- cp(c ). 
(vii) p If- 1\ C/J iff for each cp E cfJ and q 3 p there is an r 3 q such that r If- cp. 
(viii) plf-waxcp iffplf-axcp. 
(ix) p If- w ( cp ----;. 1{1) iff for each q 3 p such that q lf-w cp, there is an r};: q su.ch that 
r If- 1{1. 
Proof. The proofs of (i), (iii)-(vii), and (ix) are very easy. (ii) is proved by 
induction on the complexity of cp. To show the induction step for cp of the form 
::lx l{l(x) we must check that q If- ::lx l{l(x) whenever q 3 p and p If- ::lx l{l(x ). Suppose 
plf-::lxl{l(x). Then for all d>p, plf-11{1(d). But q3p, so d>p. Thus plf--,l{l(d) 
whenever d > q. By inductive hypothesis, q If--, I{!( d) for d > q. Therefore q lf-
::lx l{l(x). 
(viii) follows from (v) since ax cp(x) abbreviates I::IX cp(x). D 
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In the previous section we defined the notion of an ideal model. The following 
technical lemma will be used later to show that each of the ::!-generic models is 
(equivalent to) an ideal model of LA(::l). 
Lemma 2.2. If P is a forcing property for the language L(::l) then 0 weakly forces 
(11 )-(IS) for each <p(x,), t{!(x) of LA(::l). 
Proof. (I I): Pick pEP and dE D. We claim there is a q? p such that q If- d =d. By 
(iv) (c) of the definition of forcing property there is a c E C and q0 E P such that 
(c=d)Ej(q0 ). Let <p(c) be the sentence (c=d); therefore <p(d) is (d=d). So by 
(iv)(b) (c =d), <p(c) E f(q0 ) implies there is a q? q0 such that <p(d) E j(q ). Therefore 
(d =d) E f(q) and it follows that q If- d =d. 
We have shown that for every pEP and dE D there is a q? p that forces d =d. 
It follows that 0 If- Ox (x = x ). 
(12): Let pEP and c 1 EC. If there is a d 1 ED and q?p such that (d 1 =c 1)E 
j(q ), then let p 1 be such a q. Otherwise let p 1 = p. 
Claim. For every d>p 1 there is no q?p 1 such that (d=c 1)Ef(q). 
Suppose there was such a q and say (d=c 1)Ef(q) for some d>p 1• By the 
definition of p1 above, there must be a d1 such that (d1 =c1)Ef(p 1). So (d==cJl, 
(d 1 =c 1)Ef(q). By (iv)(b) of the definition of forcing property there is an r?q 
such that (d 1 =d)Ef(r). But d>p. implies d¥-d 1, so (d 1 =d)Ef(r) contradicts 
(iv)(d) of the definition of forcing property. The claim is proved. 
Therefore for each d>p 1 , p 11f--,(d=c1), so p 1 1f-::lx (x=c 1). We have shown 
that for every pEP and c 1 E C there is a v,? p such that p 1 1f-::lx (x == c 1). Hence 
Olf-Vy::lx(x==y). 
(I3) By Lemma 2.1 (ix: we need only show that if p weakly forces V x ( <p(x) --7 
t{!(x)) and ::lx t{!(x ), then there is a q? p such that q If- ::lx <p(x ). The assumptions are 
equivalent to the following two statements: 
(1) For all c E C and q? p there is an extension ot q that forces 
l<p(c)vt{!(c). 
(2) For every q? p there is an r? q such that whenever d > r, r forces 
it{!(d). 
By (2) there is a q0 ?p such that for every d>q1h q0 lf-1t{!(d). Suppose there is 
a d>q0 and an r?q0 such that rlf-<p(d). By (iv)(c) there are an r0 ?r and xEC 
such that r0 1f-d=c, and thus there is an r1 ?r0 such that r1 1f-<p(c). By (1) there is 
an s?r1 such that slf--,<p(c)vt{!(c). Buts? r1 implies slf-<p(c) by Lemma 1 (ii), so 
it follows that s If- t{!(c ). However, s If- d = c and s If- t{!(c) implies there is a t? s such 
that tlf-t{!(d). But d>q0 and t?q0 gives tlf--,t{!(d) by the definition of q0 . From 
this contradiction it follows that for every d > q0 , q0 lf-1 <p (d), and so q0 If- ::lx <p(x ). 
(14) Trivial by the definition of forcing since p If- ::lx <p(x) iff p If- ::ly <p(y) if y is 
free for x in <p(x ). 
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(15) Again by Lemma 2.1 (ix) we need only show that if plf-w::lxcp(x)A::lxl{l(x) 
then there is a q~p such that qlf-::lx(cp(x)vl{l(x)). By Lemma 2.1 (viii) the 
hypothesis is equivalent to plf-w ::lx cp(x) and plf-w ::lx l{l(x). Thus we have: 
(3) For every q?:p, there is an r?:q such that for each d>r, rlf--,cp(d). 
(4) For every q?:p, there is an r?:q such that for each d>r, rlf-1l{l(d). 
By (3) pick a p0 ?! p such that for each d >p0 , p0 lf-1cp(d). Now by (4) pick 
q?: Po such that for each d > q, q lf--,l{l(d). Since q?: Po we have d > p0 whenever 
d > q, so for each d > q, qlf-1cp(d). 
We claim that for each d>q, qlf--,(cp(d)vl{l(d)). If not, there is a d>q, r?:q 
for which rlf-cp(d) or rlf-l{l(d). But d>q and r?:q imply rlf-1cp(d) and rlf-1l{l(d). 
Therefore for each d>q, qlf--,(cp(d)vl{l(d)), and thus qlf-::lx (cp(x)vl{l(x)). 
Definition. A subset G ~ P is said to be ::l-generic iff 
(i) p E G and q :S p implies q E G. 
(ii) p, q E G implies that there is an r E G with p :S r and q :Sr. 
(iii) For each sentence 'P in KA(::l), there is a pEG such that either p If- 'P or 
pl=icp. 
For many constructions we will want to ask more of the ::l-generic sets than 
merely forcing either 'P or 1 'P for each formula 'P of KA(::l). 
Definition. A set E of sentences is dense with respect to a forcing property P iff 
for every p E P there is a q ?: p and a 'P E E such that q If- cp. 
Remark. {cp, 1cp} is a dense set for each 'P E LA(::l). 
Definition. Let 0 be a collection of sets of sentences. A subset G ~ P is said to be 
0-generic iff 
(i) G is ::l-generic, 
(ii) for every dense E E 0, there is a p E G, 'PEE such that p If- 'P· 
Note: If 01 ~ 0 2 then every 0 2-generic set is also 0 1-generic. 
A 0-generic set G is said to generate (~,f) iff ~ is a canonical model, 
f = {s"': there is a pEG such that p If- ::lx cp(x)} where s"' = {ac: 3p E G such that 
plf-cp(c)}, and every sentence <p of KA(::l) that is forced by some pEG holds in 
(~,f). (\ll, f) is a 0-generic model for a condition pEP iff (~,f) is generated by a 
D-generic set G, that contains p. Since every D-generic model is canonical, 
each D-generic model will be countable. 
Remark. At times we will want to treat (\lt, f) as a model of LA(::l) and at others as 
a model of KA(::l). Normally we will treat (~,f) as a model of LA(::l). We will write 
(~c.D' f) to emphasize the role of the constants when we are dealing with KA (::l). 
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Theorem 2.3. (Generic Model Theorem): If Pis a forcing property for L(::l), Dis 
a countable collection of dense sets, and pEP; then there is a D-generic model for 
p. 
Proof. As in Keisler [ 11], it is easy to show that every pEP belongs to a 
D-generic set since D is countable. For each D-generic set G, we show there is a 
canonical model (~{,f) such that every sentence forced by some p E G holds in 
(~t, f). 
LetT be the set of all sentences of KA(::l) which are forced by some pEG. Then 
the following hold for all sentences and terms without free variables in KA(::l): 
( 1) Exactly one of <p, '({! belongs to T. 
(2) V 4> belongs to T iff <p is in T for some <p E 4>. 
(3) 3x <p(x) belongs toT iff <p(c) is in T for some c E C. 
(4) Let u and T be terms of K without variables and <p(x) a formula of KA(::l). 
If (T~a) belongs toT, then (a~T) belongs toT. If (T~a), <p(T) belong toT 
for <p(x) atomic, then <p(u) belongs toT. For some c E C, (c ~ T) belongs toT. 
( 1) follows from the definition of ::l-generic set, (2) and (3) from the definition 
of forcing, and (4) from the definition of forcing property . 
.I ust as in Henkin's proof of the completeness theorem, a canonical model 
(~lc.0, f) is constructed, where ~tc,o is a canonical model of KA and f = {s'~': there is 
a pEG such that p If- ::lx <p{x)} as given in the definition of a ::l-generic model. We 
then show by induction that for each sentence <p of KA(::l), (m:c,n, f) I= <p iff <pET. 
We exhibit only the induction steps for 3x l/J(x) and ::lx l/J(x): 
3xl/J(x): 
(~tc.0,f)l=3xl/J(x) iff (m:,f)l=l/J(ac) for some cEC 
iff 1/f(c)ET 
iff 3xl/l(x)ET. 
The first equivalence holds by the definition of satisfaction and the fact that 
(~lc.o· f) is canonical. The second equivalence 'holds by induction, and the third by 
(3) above. 
::lx l/J(x): 
(~IC.D• f)l=::lxl/J(x) iff S.y E f. 
iff there is a p E G such that p If- ::lx 1/f(x ). 
iff ::lxl/J(x)ET. 
The only one of the above equivalences that requires any work is in showing that 
s.v E f implies there is a p E G such that p If- ::lx 1/f(x ). From s.y E f it follows that there 
is a <p E KA(::l) for which there is a p' such that p'lf-::lx <p(x) and s'~' = s.y. Therefore 
there is a q E G such that q If- 'v' x ( <p(x) ~ l/J(x )). Since G is a generic set and 0 
weakly forces (l3), we can see that there is a p E G such that p If- ::lx l/J(x ). 
From this induction it follows that (~tc.o• f)I=T. D 
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The following corollary shows the connection between weak forcing and 
satisfaction in D-generic model~. 
Coronary 2.4. Let P be a forcing property for L(:::l), pEP, and cp E KA(:::I). Then 
plf--wcp iff cp holds in every D-generic model for p. Thus if T={cpEKA(:::I):plf--wcp} 
and Tl= l/J then p lf--w l/J. 
Proof. Let p lf--w cp and let (~l, f) be a D-generic model for p. Then p lf---rl cp. Hence 
(~lc,0, f)lt---,--,cp by the definition of (~lc.o. f), and so (mc.o. f)l=cp. 
Suppose p does not weakly force cp. Then for some q;:: p, q lf--1cp. Let (mc.o. f) 
be a D-generic model for q. Therefore (mc.o' f) is also a D-generic model for p 
and (~lc,D• f) It--, cp. 0 
Coronary 2.5. If P is a forcing property for the language L(:::l) then any D-generic 
model for apE P is (equivalent to) an ideal model of LA(::!) (i.e., it satisfies axioms 
(11)---(15)). 
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, 0 weakly forces (11)---(15). Therefore by Corollary 2.4, 
(Il )---(15) hold in every 0-generic model, and hence each D-generic model is 
equivalent to an ideal model. 0 
From now on we assume that each 0-generic model is an ideal model. 
We now have a method of constructing countable ideal models of LA(::!). Our 
goal, however, is to construct uncountable standard models of LA(:::I1). To do this 
we need to look at a particular type of forcing property, P(M, cP), to be defined 
below. 
Let cP be a set of formulas of LA(::!) that contains all basic formulas of L and is 
closed under subformulas. Recall that cPs is the set of all formulas of the form 
(Sx) 1\m<n'Pm where 'Pm E cP for each m < n and Sx is a finite string of Oxi 's and 
3xi's. Let cPs(C, D) be the set of all sentences that are free substitution instances 
of formulas of cPs with elements from CUD. Let M be a non-empty class of 
cPs-good ideal models of LA(::!). (See Sectidn 1 for the definition of cPs-good.) 
Definition. The forcing property P(M, cP) is defined to be the set of all finite 
subsets, p(d,c), of cPs(C,D) such that d=d 1d2 · .. dn where d1<o 
d2 <0 · · · <0 d," and Ox3y/\p(x,y) holds in some (~l,f)EM. We define q;::p iff 
q 2 p, f(p) is the set of all atomic sentences in p, and g(p) is the set of all dE D 
that occur in some cp E p. 
Remarks. ( l) The order of the d's is important in the definition of P(M, cP) since 
t' 1 Ox Oy cp ~ Oy Ox cp. 
(2) Ox 3y 1\p(x, y) is equivalent in LA(::!) to a formula of cPs by Proposition 1.6. 
(3) If qEP(M,cP) and q2p then pEP. 
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Proof of (3). q(d, c) E P(M, <P) means Ox 3y 1\q(x, y) is satisfiable in M. q(d, c) 2 
p(d, c) implies f-'v'x (3y 1\q(x, y) ~ 3y 1\p(x, y)). Therefore by (13), Ox 3y 1\p(x, y) 
is satisfiable in M. Hence p(d,c)EP(M,<P). D 
The following examples will be important for applications of this technique in 
the following sections and illustrate the flexibility of this method of constructing 
models of L(::l). 
Examples. (i) P(M, <1>0 ) for <P0 the set of all basic formulas of L. This gives a 
Robinson-style forcing. Many of Robinson's results on finite forcing carry over in 
this case. (See Bruce [5] for a more thorough investigation of this case) 
(ii) P(M, <1>8 ) for <P8 the set of all formulas of L8 for B <;;A and L8 a countable 
fragment of L"'I"'' This example will be important for investigating uncountable 
models of first-order theories. 
(iii) P(M, <Ps(ooJ)) for <Ps(ooJ) the set of all formulas of L8 (::l) where B <;;A and L8 (::l) 
a countable fragment of L"'I"'(::l). Forcing properties of this form will be useful in 
studying the model theory of LA(::l1). (See Bruce and Keisler [6] for proofs of 
several results in the model theory of LA(::l1) using this new method of forcing.) 
Definition. A D(M, $)-generic model is a D-generic model generated from the 
forcing property P(M, <P). If D = 0 we will call these structures (M, $)-generic 
models. 
The following concept will be important in the proof of our key Lemma 2.7. 
Definitions. We say p E P(M, <P) is satiated iff for each c occurring in p and d > p, 
p' is not an element of P(M, <P), where p' is obtained from p by replacing each 
occurrence of c in P by d. In other words Ox 3y1 • • • Yn/\p(x, y) is satisfiable in M 
but Ox Oy; 3y1 • • · y; · · · Yn/\p(x, y) is not, for each 1:;;;; i:;;;; n. (Note: y; means y; 
is omitted from the string.) 
Lemma 2.6. For each p E P(M, <P) there is a satiated p* ~ p. 
Proof. p(d, c) E P(M, <P) implies Ox 3y /\ p(x, y) is satisfiable in M. Suppose there 
is a Y; occurring in y such that Ox Oy; 3y; · · · Y; · · · Yn /\ p(x, y) is satisfiable in M. 
Pick d'>p and let p'(d,d',c)=p(d,c)U{d'=c;}. Clearly OxOz3yAp'(x,y,z) is 
satisfiable in M. Therefore p' E P(M, <P). Note that d' > p puts the z which 
replaces d' to the right of all x's in the quantification. Also note that 
Ox Oz Oy; 3y1 • • • Y; · · · Yn /\ p'(x, y, z) is not satisfiable in M since this implies 
that Oz Oy1 (z = y;) is satisfiable in M, contradicting (12). Continue the above 
process until no such Y; exists. No new elements of C are ever added to the 
forcing conditions so only a finite number of such extensions can be made. The 
resulting p* is clearly satiated. 
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The following key lemma will form the basis for our construction of D(M, 41 )-
generic models for arbitrary consistent theories. When the correct definition for 
forcing in LA(::!) was being sought, one of the prime criteria was that the following 
lemma hold for the definition. An analog of this lemma for finite forcing in 
languages without extra quantifiers appears in a slightly different form in Keisler 
[ 11]. 
Definition. <pis compatible with pin P(M, ciJ) iff pU{cp}EP(M, $). 
Lemma 2.7. For all p E P(M, $) and all sentences <p E ciJ5 ( C, D), 
(*) there is an extension q of p such that q If- <p iff <p is compatible with p. 
Proof. We will proceed by induction on the complexity of <p. Note especially the 
induction steps for 3z 1/f(z) and ::lz 1/f(z ), and the interaction between the definition 
of forcing and the forcing property P(M, $). 
Case 1. <p is atomic. In this case (*) holds since p If- <p iff <p E'p. 
Case 2. <p =II/I. 
q lf-11/1 iff there is no r ~ q such that r lf-1/1 
iff 1/J is not compatible with q 
iff Ox 3y (/\q 1\ 1/J) is not satisfiable in M. 
By the above string of equivalences it is sufficient to show that there is a q ~ p 
such that Ox 3y (/\q 1\ t{l) is not satisfiable in M iff Ox 3y (/\p 1\ 1 t{l) is satisfiable 
in M. 
(:::}) q E P(M, cp) implies Ox 3y /\ q IS satisfiable in M. Therefore 
Ox3y(/\qA(I/fvll/f)) is satisfiable in M and hence either Ox3y(/\qvi/J) or 
Ox 3y (/\q v 11/1) is satisfiable in M by (15). Since by assumption Ox 3y (/\q 1\ 1/1) is 
not satisfiable in M, it follows that Ox 3y (1\q 1\ 11/1) must be. Hence Ox 3y (/\p 1\ 
11/1) is satisfiable in M. 
( ¢:) Let q = p U { 11/1}. Then by assumption q E P. Also f-1(/\q 1\ 1/J) and thus 
f- 13X 3y (/\q 1\ 1/J). Since f-Oxl/f ~ 3x <p it follows that f-10x 3y (/\q 1\ 1/J). There-
fore Ox 3y (1\q 1\ t{l) is not satisfiable in M. 
Case 3. <p '"" 3z t{l(z ). The following are equivalent: 
There is a q ~ p such that q If- 3z tf!(z ). 
There is a q ~ p, c E C such that q lf-1/f(c ). 
There is a c E C such that 1/f(c) is compatible with p. 
Ox 3y 3z (/\p 1\ t{l(z )) is satisfiable in M. 
Ox 3y (/\p 1\ 3z 1/f(z )) is satisfiable in M. 
3z 1/f(z) is compatible with p. 
The equivalence of the second and third statements is by the induction hypothesis. 
A slight modification of (:::}) of the next to last equivalence must be made if c 
occurs in p. 
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Case 4. 'P = V 1/f. Proceed as in Case 3 using the fact that axiom (A9) holds for 
Ox 3yV </>E'~' (/\p A l/1). 
Case 5. 'P = :lz lf!(z ). ( :::;>) If q If- :lz lf!(z) then for all d > q, q lf--,l/l(d). By induction 
it follows that for all d > q, lf!(d) is not compatible with q, and therefore 
Ox Oz 3y (1\q A lf!(z )) is not satisfiable in M. 
Now q E P(M, 4>) implies Ox 3y 1\q is satisfiable tn M and thus 
Ox 3y (1\q A (:lz l/J(z) v Oz lf!(z)) is satisfiable in M. Therefore by axiom (15): 
( 1) Ox 3y (1\q A :lz l/J(z )) is satisfiable in M, or 
(2) Ox 3y (1\q A0z lf!(z)) is satisfiable in M. 
But if (2) holds, then Ox Oy 3y (1\q A lf!(z)) is satisfiable in M by Lemma 1.2(ii). 
However, this contradicts qlf-:lz lf!(z) as above. Therefore (1) holds and :lz lf!(z) is 
compatible with q. It follows that :lz lf!(z) is compatible with p. 
( ¢:) Let q = p U {:lz lf!(z, d, c)} E P(M, 4>) where all the constants from C U D 
occurring in lf! are displayed, and let q*?: q be satiated. (Such a q* exists by 
Lemma 2.6.) We now prove that q*lf-:lz lf!(z, d, c). 
Suppose not. Then there is an e>q* and an r?:q* such that rlf-lf!(e,d,c). By 
induction q* U {tf!(e, d, c)} E P(M, 4>), and hence Ox Oz 3y (1\q* A l/J(z, x, y )) is sat-
isfiable in M. Let y = y1 • • • Yn· By axiom (A6) either 
(3) Ox 3y 1 Oz 3y2 • • • Yn(/\q* A l/J(z, x, y)) is satisfiable in M, or 
(4) Ox Oy 1 3z 3y2 · · · Yn(/\q* A l/l(z, x, y)) is satisfiable in M. 
Now (4) implies that Ox Oy 1 3y2 • • • Yn(/\q*) is satisfiable in M, but this con-
tradicts the fact that q* is satiated. Therefore (3) holds. 
If we apply axiom (A6) and repeat the above process n -l times, we obtain the 
result that Ox 3y Oz (1\q* A lf!(z, x, y)) is satisfiable in M. Therefore Ox 3y (1\q* A 
Oz l/l(z, x, y )) is satisfiable in M since z does not occur in q* (recall e > q*). But 
:lz l/1( z, d, c) E q *. Contradiction! Therefore q * ?: p and q *If- :lz l/J( z, d, c). 
We must also do special cases for 1\ and Oz if 1\m<n 'Pm, Oz cp E 4>5 \ 4> (since in 
this case the subformulas V m<n 1 'Pm, :lz cp are not members of 4>5 ). These are 
similar to the above cases and their proofs are omitted. D 
An important consequence of the above lemma is the following: 
Corollary 2.8. Let 'P be a sentence such that 
(i) cp E 4>5 , or 
(ii) cp = il/J where l/1 E 4>5 . 
Then if cp holds in all (\ll, f) EM, 0 lf-w cp. 
Proof. Case (i). 'P E 4>5 . We must show that for each pEP there is a q""' p such 
that q If- cp. If pEP then Ox 3y 1\p is satisfiable in M. Since cp holds in all (\ll, f) EM, 
Ox 3y f\p A 'P is satisfiable in M. Hence by Lemma 1.2(iii) Ox 3y (/\p A 'P) is 
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satisfiable in M, and therefore cp is compatible with p. By Lemma 2.7 there is a 
q ;o, p such that q If- cp. 
Case (ii). cp = 1 t{! where t{! E $ 5 . Suppose p If- t{! for some pEP. Then by Lemma 
2.7, {t{!}EP and hence t{! is satisfiable in M. However, by assumption 1t{! holds in 
all (W, f) EM. This contradiction shows Olf-1t{! and hence 0 11-w cp. 
We now begin to describe the way we use D(M, $)-generic models to build 
standard models of LA(::J1). Some of the important dense sets we will use are 
defined below. 
Definition. For each t{!(z) we define {3(t{!(z)) = {::Jz t{!(z)} U {t{!(d): dE D}. Also if 
(W,f) is an ideal model and cEC, we define o(t{!,c,W)={It{!(c)}U{c=a:aEA} 
where each ii is a new constant symbol that is interpreted as a in (W, f). 
The following type of extension will be very important in our construction of 
standard models. 
Definition. An ideal model (W', f') is a $-generic extension of the $ 5 -good ideal 
model (W, f) iff (W', f') is a D(M, $')-generic model for M = {(W*, f)}, where cP' is 
the set of all finite substitution instances of formulas of <P with constants from 
A and D = {f3(t{!(z)): t{!(c) E $~( C, D)} U {o(t{!, c, W): (W*, f)F::Jz t{!-(z), c·E C, and 
t{!(z) E $~}. 
For this definition to make sense we must show that each of the sets in D is 
really dense. We do this in the following two lemmas. 
Lemma 2.9. For each t{!(c)E <P~(C, D), {3(t{!(z)) is dense with respect to the forcing 
property P(M, $'). 
Proof. Let p E P(M, $). If there is a q ;o, p for which q If- ::Jz t{!(z) then we are done. 
If not, p lf-1::Jz t{!(z) and therefore for each q;;;,: p there is a d >q and r ;o, q 
such that rll- t{!(d). Therefore there is a d > p, q;;;,: p, such that q If- t{!(d) and hence 
{3(t{!(z)) is dense. D 
Note. We can actually do better than this and show for each dE D, 
{::Jzt{!(z)}U{t{!(d'):d'> 0 d} is dense. 
Lemma 2.10. Let M={(W*,f)}. Then o(t{!,c,W) is a dense set with respect to 
P(M, $')for each c E C and t{!(z)E $~such that (W*, f)lf-::Jz t{!(z). 
Proof. Suppose ('lf*, f)F::Jz t{!(z), p(d, c)E P(M, $')and c' E C. If there is an exten-
sion of p that forces 1 t{!(c') then we are done. Otherwise there is an extension of 
p that forces t{!(c'). By Lemma 2.7 it follows that t{!(c') is compatible with p, and 
therefore (\}{*,f) FOx 3z 3y U\P A t{!(z )). Applying axiom (A6) n =length (x) times 
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we get: 
(1) (~*,f)t=Qz3x3y(/\pAI{I(z)),or 
(2) (~*, f)t=3z Qx 3y (1\p 1\ l{l(z )). 
However, if (1) holds then(~*, f)t=Qz l{l(z), contradicting our hypotheses. There-
fore (2) holds and there is an aEA such that (~*,f)t=Qx3y(/\p(a)AI{I(a)). 
Equivalently(~*, f)t=Qx 3y 3z (1\p 1\ l{l(z)/\ z =a). Thus c' =a is compatible with 
p(d, c), and hence 8(1{1, c', ~) is dense in P(M, «P'). D 
The following theorem illustrates why <P-generic extensions play such an 
important role in our construction of standard models. 
Theorem 2.11. If (~', f') is a <P- generic extension of (~, f) then for each bE An 
and l{l(x,y)E<Ps we have (~,f)F:::Ixl{l(x,b) i.ff{aEA':(~',f'~FI{I(a,b)}s;A. 
Proof. (:::}) Let G be the D(M, ct>')-generic set generating (~', f'). Suppose 
(~,f)F:::Ixl{l(x,b) and (~',f')t=l{l(a',b). Since (~C:.v,f') is canonical, a' is the in-
terpretation of some c' E C. Because (~C:.v, f') is D(M, cP')-generic there is a 
condition p E G such that p If- l{l(c', b). But since 8( 1{1, c', ~) is a dense set in D 
there is a qEG such that qlf--,l{l(c',b) or qlf-c'=a for some aEA. But if 
qlf--,l{l(c',b), then since p,qEG there is an rEG such that r~p and r~q. 
Therefore r If- 1{1( c', b) and r lf-1 1{1( c', b). This contradiction implies there is a 
condition q E G and an element a E A such that q If- c' =a. Therefore a' EA. 
(¢)If (~',f')t=Qxl{l(x,b) then there is a pEG such that plf-Qxl{l(x,b). There-
fore there is no condition in G that forces :::lx l{l(x, b). But since {3(1{1(x, b))= 
{:::lxl{l(x,b)}U{I{I(d,b):dED} is dense, there is a dED and qEG such that 
qlf-l{l(d,b). For each aEA, Olf--,(d=a) since Qx(x=a) is inconsistent. Also 
since (~' c,v, f') is canonical there is a c E C and an r E G such that r If- d = c. Hence 
we also have rlf--,(c =a) for each a EA. Therefore if a' is the interpretation of c 
in (~'c.v,f'), (~',f')t=l{l(a',b) and a'~A. 0 
Theorem 2.11 says that a <P-generic extension is very nice in the sense that 
each of the cPs-definable "big" sets is fattened while the cPs-definable "small" sets 
are not allowed to grow. Therefore if we put together an uncountable chain of 
these extensions we can build a model in which :::lx really means "there are at 
most countably many x" and Qx means "there are ·uncountably many x." This is 
the idea behind the next definition. 
Definition. We say that a standard model ~ of LA(.:::I) is an (M, cP)-standard-
generic model iff there is a chain of countable ideal models { (~,, f.,): a < w1} such 
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that: 
(i) (~0 , f0 ) is an (M, <P)-generic model, 
(ii) (~a+ 1 , fa+l) is a <P-generic extension of (~"' f") for each a< w 1 , 
(iii) (~,~., f,~.) = Ua<A (~,, f") for A a limit ordinal, 
(iv) ~ = UA<w, ~A· 
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Note. Recall that in a standard model, ::lx is interpreted as "there exist at most 
countably many x." Therefore a standard model ~ is the same as (~,f) for 
f={scA: lsl~w}. 
We now come to the main theorem of this chapter. 
Theorem 2.12. (Standard-Generic Model Theorem). Let M be a class of 4>5 -good 
ideal models of LA(::I). Then there is an (M, <P)-standard-generic model~ such that 
for each (~,, f"') in the construction, (~"' f") < <Ps ~. 
Before we begin the proof of Theorem 2.12 we need one more technical result. 
Recall that in our definition of P(M, <P) we required that M be a class of 4>5 -good 
ideal models. We now show that every (M, <P)-generic, and hence every D(M, <P)-
generic model, is 4>5 -good. 
Lemma 2.13. If P(M, <P) is a forcing property, then every (M, <P)-generic model is 
a 4>5 -good ideal model. In particular if (~', f') is a <P-generic extension of (~,f) 
where (~,f) is 4>5 -good, then (~', f') is also 4>5 -good. 
Proof. By Corollary 2.5, any (M, <P)-generic model is an ideal model. We must 
now show that each (M, <P)-generic model is 4>5 -good. By Corollary 2.4, it will 
suffice to show that axioms (A6) and (A9), for appropriate 'P E 4>5 and e <:; 4>5 , are 
weakly forced by 0. 
(A6): Suppose p 11-w Ox 3w 'P(Z, w) and p 11-w ::lw 3z 'P(Z, w) for 'P E 4>5 . We must 
show there is an extension of p that forces 3w Oz 'P(z, w). 
By our assumptions and Lemma 2.7 the following hold: 
(1) Oz 3w 'P(z, w) is compatible with p, and 
(2) Ow 3z 'P(z, w) is not compatible with p. 
By (1) and the fact that Qz 3w 'P(Z, w) ~ 3w0z 'P(Z, w) vOw 3z 'P(Z, w) holds in 
M, 
(3) 3w Qz 'P(z, w) is compatible with p, or 
(4) Ow 3z 'P(z, w) is compatible with p. 
However, (4) contradicts (2) so (3) must hold. Therefore by Lemma 2.7 some 
extension of p forces 3w Oz 'P(Z, w ). 
(A9): Suppose pll-wOzVB(z) for B(z)s; <Ps and V B(z)ELA(::I). If we follow 
through the definitions and apply Lemma 2. 7, we find that the hypothesis is 
250 K.B. Bruce 
equivalent to the following: 
(5) For every extension q of p there is a d>q and OEB for which O(d) is 
compatible with q. 
Let p* be a satiated extension of p that contains each of the finite number of 
constants from CUD that occur in B(z ). By (5) there is a d > p* and (} E 8 such 
that O(d) is compatible with p*. Therefore Ox Oz 3y U'w* 1\ O(z)) is satisfiable in 
M. Note that Oz occurs to the right of the Ox since d > p*. Since p* is satiated, it 
follows that Ox 3y (/\p* A0z O(z)) is satisfiable in M. Again applying Lemma 2.7 
there is an extension q of p* that forces Oz O(z ). By the definition of forcing for 
V, q If- V BE<') Oz O(z ). We have shown there is an extension of p that forces 
V BE(·) Oz O(z ), so 0 If- woz V B(z) ~ V llEB Oz O(z ). D 
W c now have all of tlv.; tools necessary to complete our construction of 
standard-generic models. 
Proof of 'rbeorem 2.12. Let P(M, <P) be a forcing property for LA(:!). We will 
build a <1>5 -elementary chain of models by induction. 
Stage 0. Let (~10 , f0 ) be an (M, $)-generic model. By Lemma 2.13, (~l0 , f0 ) is a 
<P5 -good ideal model. 
Stage 1' + 1. By induction (~,, f,) is a <P5 -good ideal model. Therefore let 
(~l-v+" f,+ 1) be a </>-generic extension of (~,, f,). Again by Lemma 2.13, 
(~l,+" f,+ 1) is a <P5 -good ideal model. By Corollary 2.8 and the definition of a 
</>-generic extension, (~l,, f) <<Ps (~-v+l, f,+ 1). 
Stage A. For A~ w 1 a limit ordinal, let (~A' fA)= Ua<A (~"' f"). By Theorems 1.5 
and 1. 7, the union of a <P5 -elementary chain of <P5 -good ideal models is a 
<P5 -good ideal model that is a <P5 -elementary extension of each(~"' f") for a< A. 
~lw1 is our (M, </>)-standard-generic model. By induction we know that 
(~l", f") <<Ps (~w1 , CJ Therefore to show that (~"'f) <<Ps ~w1 we need only show 
that ~lw 1 <<P, (~lw1 , CJ We prove this by induction on the complexity of formulas. 
The induction step is trivial for all but the ::lx (or Ox) stage: 
Suppose ~! 1 1=<p(a,b) iff (~! 1 ,fw)I='P(a,b) for all a,bEAw,· We will show 
~l! 1 1=::lx<p(x,b) iff (~! 1 ,fw)l=::lx<p(x,b) for <p(x,y)E<P5 . 
(¢:)Suppose (~l! 1 ,C)I=::lx<p(x,b). Let a<w 1 be such that bEA~. Therefore 
(91!, (,)l=::lx <p(x, b) since (~w,, C) is a <P5 -elementary extension of (~"' f"). For 
each 1'? a, 
{a E A,+ 1 : (~~+ 1 , f,+ 1)1= <p(a, b)} s; {a E A,:(~~, f~)l= <p(a, b)} 
by Theorem 2.11 since (~,+ 1 , f,+ 1) is a </>-generic extension of(~,, f,). Clearly no 
new elements are added at limit stages either. Therefore 
S<P ={a E Aw,: (~w1 , C) I= <p(a, b)} S A 13 • 
Since IA,J=w and (~C1 ,fw)I='P(a,b) iff ~w1 1=<p(a,b) it follows that ~l=::lx<p(x,b). 
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(:::?)If (~lw,,C)FOxc,o(x,b) then as above there is a {3<w 1 such that (~ 13 ,f13 )F 
Ox cp(x, b). Since the (~lc, fa )'s form a cPs-elementary chain, it follows that for 
each {3;;o:<w 1 , (~l!,fa)FOxc,o(x,b). By Theorem 2.11, for each o:<w1 there is 
an aaEAa+ 1\Aa such that (~la+I,fa+l)Fcp(aa,b) since (~la+l,fa+t) is a $-generic 
extension of (~!"',f"'). Therefore the cardinality of s<P is w 1 and ~l!,FOxc,o(x,b). 
Hence for all cp(x) E cPs, bE Aw,, 
(~!!,, C)Fc,o(bJ iff ~!!Yc,o(b), 
and thus (91,, f,) <<Ps ~!w, for each a< w 1 • 
In the same way that we have proved Theorem 2.12 we can obtain a new proof 
of the completeness theorem for L(.::l 1 ). We can accomplish this by replacing 
P(M, 4>) by P(T, 4>) where P(T, 4>) is defined in the same way as P(M, 4>) with the 
exception that the phrase "'Ox 3y A p(x, y) is satisfiable in M" is replaced by 
··ox 3y A p(x, y) is consistent with T in L(.::l 1)." Slight changes must then be made 
to the proofs of the lemmas leading up to Theorem 2.12. In Bruce [ 4] and Bruce 
and Keisler [6], the proof of the completeness theorem for LA(.::Itl is accomplished 
in just this way. 
3. A new omitting types theorem for LA(.::I) 
One of the main advantages of the forcing method is the control we have over 
the construction of models. This is especially important in building models of 
LA(.::I1) since they are constructed as a union of a chain of models of length w 1 • In 
this section we will take advantage of this fine control to analyze the class of 
formulas that are preserved in the forcing construction. One of our most impor-
tant results is a new omitting types theorem for LA(.::I1 ). 
The omitting types theorem for L states that if 8(x) is a countable collection of 
formulas of L, Tis a consistent theory of L, and T locally omits 8(x) then there is 
a model ofT omitting 8(x). Recall that T locally omits 8(x) iff for every 3xc,o(x) 
consistent with T there is a ll(x)EB(x) such that 3x(cp(x)Aill(x)) is consistent 
with T. A model ~l of T omits 8(x) if there is no a E A" such that ~ F 1\ 8[a ]; in 
other words ~!F'v'xVeEelll(x). 
It is easy to see that this theorem fails for standard models of L(.::l1). For 
example, let (~!,f) be any countable model of L(.::11) and let T = Th(~*, f). If 
8(x) = {IX== a: a E A} then it is easy to see that T locally omits 8(x) but there is 
no standard model of L(.::l1) that omits 8(x). (If there was such a standard model, 
m, then m would satisfy 'v' X VaEA (x == ii) and hence \8 would be countable. 
Contradiction!) In Keisler [10] a version of the omitting types theorem for L(.::l1) is 
proved in which "'locally omits" is replaced by "strongly omits." A theory T 
strongly omits 8(x) iff for every (Sy )3x c,o(x, y) consistent with T there is a 
ll(x) E 8(x) such that (Sy )3x (cp(x, y) A 1 ll(x)) is consistent with T. In the above, 
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Sy is any finite sequence of Oy; and 3yi quantifiers. In our example above T does 
not strongly omit B(x) since Oy 3x (x = y) is consistent with T but there is no 
a E A such that Oy 3x (x = y 1\ x =a) is consistent with T. This last sentence is 
inconsistent since it is equivalent to Oy(y =a). 
In what follows we will show there is a weaker condition than "strongly 
omitting" which suffices to prove an omitting types result for LA(::l1). 
In working with infinitary languages it is often more convenient to discuss the 
related concepts of a theory "locally implying" or "strongly implying" a set of 
formulas. We say that T locally [strongly] implies EJ(x) iff for each 3x cp(x) 
[Sy3xcp(x,y)] that is consistent with T there is a O(x)EEJ(x) such that 
3x (cp(X)/\ O(x))[Sy 3x (cp(x, y)A O(x))] is consistent with T. Clearly T locally 
[strongly] implies {18(x):8(x)EB(x)} iff T locally [strongly] omits B(x). The 
omitting types theorem for L now states that if T locally implies B(x) then T has a 
model satisfying Vx V B(x). 
The following is a first approximation to. our new omitting types result for 
LA(::ll). 
Theorem 3.1. (Weak Omitting Types Theorem) Let M be a class of cPs-good 
ideal models of LA(::!) and let P=P(M, cP). Suppose VwVn<w'Pn(w) is a sentence 
of LA(::!) such that 'Pn E cPs for each n < w. Then the following are equivalent: 
(i) The sentence Vw V n<w 'Pn( w) is true in every (M, cP)-generic model. 
(ii) For every tfi(x, w) E cPs such that the sentence Ox 3w tfi(x, w) is satisfiable in 
M, there is an n < w such that Ox 3w ( tfi(x, w) 1\ 'Pn ( w)) is also satisfiable in M. 
Proof. The following are equivalent: 
(1) VwVn<w'Pn(w) holds in every (M, cP)-generic model. 
(2) For all c E em, V n<w 'Pn (c) holds in all generic models. 
(3) For all cEem, Olf-w Vn<w'Pn(c). 
(4) For all c E em and pEP, there exists a q ""'p and an n < w such that 
q If- 'Pn (C)· 
(5) For all c E em and pEP, there is an n < w such that cp.,.(c) is compatible 
with p. 
( 6) For every t/J(x, w) E cPs such that the sentence Ox 3w tfi(x, w) is satisfiable in 
M, there is an n < w such that Ox 3w ( t/J(x, w) 1\ 'Pn ( w)) is satisfiable in M. 
The equivalence of the first four statements is clear. (4)<:>(5) holds by Lemma 
2.7. We show the equivalence of (5) and (6) below. 
((5)::? (6)): Suppose tfi(x, w)E cPs such that Ox 3w tfi(x, w) is satisfiable in M. 
Then {t/l(d, c)}E p for d an increasing sequence of elements of D and c E em 
where each of the c;'s in c are distinct. Therefore by (5), there is an n < w such 
that cp"(c) is compatible with {t/l(d, c)}. By definition this means Ox 3w (t/l(x, w)A 
'Pn ( w)) is satisfiable in M. 
((6)::?(5)): Let cEem and p(d,c,c')EP. Therefore Ox3w3yi\p(x,w,y) is 
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satisfiable in M. Since 3y f\P(X, w, y) is equivalent to a formula of <1>5, it follows 
from (6) that Ox 3w (3y/\P(X, w, y)A<pJw)) is satisfiable in M for some n<w. 
Therefore Ox 3w 3y (1\p(x, w, y)A <plt(w)) is satisfiable in M, so <plt(c) is compati-
ble with p(d, c, c'). 0 
Corollary 3.2. If (ii) of the previous theorem holds for M = {(~*, f)} then every 
<P- generic extension of (~,f) satisfies 'v'w V lt<w <p" ( w ). 
Proof. This follows from Theorem . 3.1 since every <!>-generic extension is an 
(M, <!>)-generic model. 
Theorem 3.1 and its corollary give conditions under which we may get 
countable models that omit a type, but we are most interested in constructing 
standard models that omit a type. Corollary 3.2 states that under the given 
conditions a <!>-generic extension omits a type. We would like to continue and 
build a chain of <!>-generic extensions, each of which omits the same type. Then 
we have some hope for showing that the standard-generic models also omit the 
type, since a standard-generic model is the union of a chain of <!>-generic 
extensions. 
Lemma 3.3. Suppose (ii) and the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1 hold for M. Then 
every (M, <!>)-generic model, (~,f), satisfies (ii) for M' ={(~*,f)} and <P' = <P(A), 
the set of all finite substitution instances of formulas of <P with constants from A. 
Proof. Let(~, f) be an (M, <!>)-generic model and(~*, f)t=Oz 3w 1/f(z, w, a) where 
all of the constants from A are displayed and 1/f(z, w, v) E <1>5 . Let G be the 
::!-generic set generating (~c.D• f). Therefore there is a p E G such that p lf-
Oz 3w 1/f(z, w, c) for some c whose interpretation in (~c,0, f) is a. Let q ~ p. Pick 
q* ~ q u { ci = ci : ci is in c} to be satiated. Therefore q* If- Oz 3w 1/f(z, W, c) and 
hence Oz 3w l/l(z, w, c) is compatible with q* by Lemma 2.7. Hence 
Ox 3y 3y'(/\q*(x, y, y')AOz 3w 1/f(z, w, y)) 
is satisfiable in M. By Lemma 1.2(ii) and predicate logic 
Ox Oz 3w (3y 3y'(/\q*(x, y, y') 1\ 1/f(z, w, y))) 
is satisfiable in M. Therefore since 3y 3y' (1\q* 1\ 1/f) is equivalent to a formula of 
<1>5 and (ii) of Theorem 3.1 holds for M, there is an n < w such that 
Ox Oz 3w (3y 3y'(/\q*(x, y, y') 1\ 1/f(z, w, y )) 1\ <pit (w )) 
is satisfiable in M. By predicate logic it follows that 
Ox Oz 3y 3y' (1\q*(x, y, y') 1\ 3w ( 1/f(z, w, y) 1\ <pit ( w))) 
is satisfiable in M. Then 
Ox 3y 3y' (1\q*(x, y, y')AOz 3w (1/J(z, w, y)A <plt(w))) 
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is satisfiable in M since q* is satiated and z does not occur in 1\q*(x, y, y'). 
Therefore Oz 3w (l/l(z, w, c)Acp,.(w)) is compatible with q*(d, c, c'), and thus by 
Lemma 2.7 there is an r:;;,q* such that rii-Oz 3w (l/l(z, w, c)Acp,.(w)). 
We have shown that pl!-wV .. <w Oz 3w (l/J(z, w, c)Acp,.(w)). Therefore there is a 
q E G that forces the above sentence, and hence there is an n < w such that 
q 11-0z 3w (lj!(z, w, c)A cp,.(w)). Since G is the :!-generic set generating (~lc.0, f) 
and a is the interpretation of c, 
(~*,f)I=Qz 3w (l/l(z, w, a)A cp,.(w)), 
so (ii) of Theorem 3.1 holds for M'={(~*,f)}. 0 
Lemma 3.3 tells us that we can get over the successor stages in building a 
standard-generic model that omits a type. In fact as the following theorem shows, 
we can go all the way up the chain. 
Theorem 3.4. Let M be a class of cPs-good ideal models of LA(:!), cp,. E cPs for each 
n < w and V w 1\n<w cp,. ( w) E LA (:I). Suppose the following holds: 
(*) For every lj!(z, w) E cPs such that the sentence Oz 3w lj!(z, w) is satisfiable in 
M, there is an n < w such that Oz 3w (l/J(z, w)A cp,.(w)) is also satisfiable in M. 
Then every (M, cP)-standard-generic model, ~' satisfies Vw V n<w cp,. ( w ). 
Proof. Recall that~{ is (M, cP)-standard-generic implies there is a cPs-elementary 
chain of models{(~{"''(.,): a< w 1} such that (~0 , f0 ) is (M, cP)-generic, (~a+ I• fa+!) 
is a cP-generic extension of (~a' fa) for each a< w 1, (~A' fJ = Ua<A (~la, fa) for A 
a limit ordinal, and ~l = Ua<w, ~{a· Also (~"'' f"') <<Ps ~ for each a< w 1• 
We will show that (*) holds for M"' ={(~!.fa)} for each a< w 1 by transfinite 
induction. Lemma 3.3 shows (*)holds for M0 = {(~l~, f0 )} and that(*) is preserved 
in successor stages. Therefore we need only check that (*) is preserved at limit 
stages. 
Suppose (*)holds forM"'= {(~l!, f"')} for every a< A where A is a limit ordinal, 
and suppose (~lt, f.JI=Oz 3w lj!(z, w, a) where cp E cPs and the finite number of 
constants from AA are displayed. Let (3 <A be such that a E Aw Since the 
(~la, f"')'s form a cPs-elementary chain, (~ 13 , f13 )1=Qz 3w lj!(z, w, a). But since (*) 
holds for M13 ={(~t,f13 )}, there is an n<w such that (~lt,f13 )F 
Oz 3w (lj!(z, w, a)A cp,.(w)). By cPs-elementarity, (~t, fA) also satisfies this same 
sentence. 
Therefore by Corollary 3.2, (~la+J,fa+l)FVwV,.<w'Pn(w) for each a<w 1 . We 
claim that ~li=VwV,.<w'P,.(w). Let aEAm and let a+l<w 1 be such that aE 
A;:'+l· Therefore (~l!+ 1 ,fa+ 1 )FV,.<w'Pn(a), and hence satisfies cp,.(a) for some 
n<w. Since (~la+l,fa+ 1 )<<Ps~l and cp,.EcPs, ~*l=cp,.(a) and therefore ~*I= 
v n<w cp,.(a). Thus ~lF'r/w Vv<w cp,.(w). 0 
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We say that a theory T s; LA (::I) is an V V cPs -theory if each of the sentences of T 
is of the form v X v n<w 'Pn (x) with 'Pn E <Ps for each n < w, and if T has a cPs -good 
ideal model. We will call EJ(x) a cPs-type if every (} E 6l is an element of cPs. 
Definition. We say T 0-locally implies the i1>s-type EJ( w) iff for every sentence 
Qz3wt/f(z,w)EcPs such that TU{Qz3wt/f(z,w)} has a cPs-good ideal model, 
there is a O(w)E EJ(w) such that TU {Qz 3w (t/l(z, w)A O(w))} has a cPs-good ideal 
model. 
Definition. Let Mod (1') ={(~,f):(~, f) is a cPs-good ideal model of T}. 
Using this terminology we can restate Theorem 3.4 in the following more 
familiar form which does not mention standard-generic models. 
Corollary 3.5. (0-0mitting Types Theorem) Let T be a countable VVcPs theory 
such that T Q-locally implies the cP~-type EJ( w ). Then there is a standard model ~ 
ofT such th~t- ~I=VwV EJ(w). (In fact if M=Mod (T) then every (M, <!>)-generic 
model~ ·satrsfies T U {Vw V EJ(w)}.) 
Proof. Pick LA(::!) large enough to contain all of the formulas of T and V w V 
EJ( w ). Let M =Mod (T). M 7" 0 since T is an V V <Ps theory. By Theorem 2.12, 
(M, cP)-standard-generic models exist. If Vx V n<w 'Pn(x) is in T, then it holds for 
all (\'ll', f') EM. We will show that \fx V n<w 'Pn (x) holds in each (M, cP)-standard-
generic model. It will be enough to verify (*)of Theorem 3.4 for \fx V n<w 'Pn (x). 
Suppose Ov 3x t/f(v, x) is satisfiable in M. We claim that Ov 3x (1/J(v, X)/\ 'Pn(x)) 
is satisfiable in M for some n < w. We see this as follows: Let T' be T plus the 
axioms for cPs-good ideal models. 
T'I=Ov 3x t/I(V, x) ~ Ov 3x (t/f(v, X)/\ v n<w 'Pn(x)), 
since v n<w 'Pn (x) holds for all X. But 
T'I=Qv 3x (1/J(v, x) A V n<w 'Pn (x)) ~ V n<w Ov 3x (1/J(v, x) A 'Pn (x)) 
by predicate logic and axiom (A9) applied to formulas in cPs. Therefore if some 
(\'11', f') EM satisfies Qv 3x 1/J( v, x) then (~', f') I= Ov3x ( t/1( v, x) 1\ 'Pn (x)) for some 
n < w. Hence by theorem 3.4, every (M, cP)-standard-generic model satisfies 
VxVn<w'Pn(x). 
Since the statement that T 0-locally implies EJ( w) corresponds to (*) of 
Theorem 3.4, every (M, cP)-standard-generic model also satisfies Vw V EJ(w). 
Therefore M 7" 0 implies there is an (M, cP)-standard-generic model ~, and ~I= 
TU{Vw V EJ(w)}. 0 
The following series of counterexamples, which are due to Julia Knight[12], 
show that the hypotheses of the 0-0mitting Types Theorem cannot be weakened. 
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Let NN be the standard model of number theory with a constant for each number, 
and let L be the corresponding language. We can treat NN as a model of L(.::l) by 
defining .::lxcp iff 3yVx>y-,cp(x) (or put another way, NNFOxcp(x) iff there is a 
cofinal sequence of natural numbers, n, such that NNFcp(ii)). By a remark in 
Section 1, the L(.::l) theory of NN is consistent in L(.::l1). We will let TN denote the 
L(.::l) theory of N N· Let 
E>(w, z)={l/t(w, z)EL(.::l):TNI='v'w 3! zl/t(w, z)} 
and P 0 (y 1)={l/t(y1):TNI=3! y1 l/t(y1)}. We define Pn(y 1, ••• , Yn+l) for n<w by 
induction: 
n 
Pn (yl, · · · , Yn+l) = Po(Yl) U U E>(y;, Yi+l). 
i=l 
The sentence 'v'y 1 · · · Yn+l V 1/fn(Y) has the interpretation that for each n + 1-tuple, 
(y 1 , ••• , Yn+ 1), either y1 is definable or for some 1 ~ k ~ n, Yk+l is definable from 
Yk· Since there are only a countable number of formulas, 'v'y V 1/fn (y) must fail in 
every uncountable model. We can show that for each n < w, 
(1) for each formula cp(x 1, ••• , Xm yb ... , Yn+l) such that NNF 
Ox 1 ···xn3ycp(x,y) there is a I.{IEPn such that NNF 
Qxl .. · Xn 3y (cp(X, y)A 1/t(y)), and yet, 
(2) there is a formula O(x1, ... , xn+b y1, ... , Yn+l) such that NNI=Qx1 · · · 
Xn+13y O(x, y) but for each 1/tE Pm NNF-,Ox1 · · • Xn+ 1 3y (8(~, y)A 1/t(y)). 
Thus these examples show that if we weaken the definition of "Q-locally implies" 
by only testing sentences of the form Qz 3w 1/t(z, w) where the length of z is less 
than some fixed n, the conclusion of the Q-Omitting Types Theorem will fail. 
Rather than giving a complete proof of (1) and (2) above we will merely outline 
the proof. Let {en : n < w} be a set of new constants. For 8 a finite set of formulas 
of L(.::l) in the free variables x 1 , ••• , xn+l' we abbreviate the formula 
/\eEEI (3xn+l O(el, ... , en, xn+l) -i> (3xn+l < y)O(el, ... ' em xn+l)) 
by y>re(e 1, ••• ,en). For each n<w let Tn be the theory 
T u {cl > ii: n EN} u {e2 > Te(el): e is a finite set of formulas of L(.::l) in two free 
variables} u ... u {en> Te(cl, ... , en-1): e is a finite set of formulas of L(.::l) in n 
free variables}. Intuitively T n says each of the constants e; for i ~ n is greater than 
any element definable from {ei: j < i}. These theories are useful since we can show 
that for each cp(x1, ••• , xn) in L(.::l), cp(e 1 , .•• , en) is consistent with Tn iff NN F 
Ox 1• • • Oxncp(x1 , ..• , xn). Hence Tn locally implies P(y 1, ..• , Yn+ 1) iff for each 
formula 1/t(xl, ... 'Xm yl, ... , Yn+l), whenever NNFOxl ... xn 3y cp(x, y) there is 
a 1/tE P such that NNI=Qx 1 • • • xn 3y (cp(x, y)Al/t(y)). 
It is clear that no model of Tn+l could satisfy 'v'y1 • • • Yn+l V Pn(y) since Tn+l 
implies e1 is not definable and no ek+l is definable from ek for 1 ~ k ~ n. 
Therefore (2) above holds. 
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We can show (1) if for each <p such that Nn F0x1 • • • xn 3y <p(x, y) we can find a 
ifJ E 1/fn such that N N F0x1 • • • xn 3y ( <p(x, y) 1\ ljl(y )). One way to find such a ljJ is to 
add a new generic function, F(y1, ••. , Yn) = Yn+J• to NN such that 
(NN, F)F0x 1 • • • xn 3y (<p(x, y)AF(y 1, ••• , Yn) = Yn+ 1). 
"Addison's trick" may then be used to show this new function is actually 
definable by a formula ljl(y 1, ••• , Yn+l) E 1/fn- Rather than building up this new 
forcing machinery and working through the details, we refer the reader to Boolos 
and Jeffrey [3] for a description of the forcing technique and "Addison's trick," 
and to Julia Knight [13] for a similar proof. 
The following partial converse of the 0-0mitting Types Theorem holds. 
Theorem 3.6. Let T be the set of all sentences of LA (::1) that hold in the standard 
model ~l, and let ~(y) be a countable set of formulas of LA(::!). If ~F'v'y V ~(y) then 
T Q-locally implies ~(y ). 
Proof. Suppose Ox 3y <p(x, y) is consistent with T. Then ~FOx 3y <p(x, y) since T 
is complete. Since ~F'v'y V ~(y) it follows that ~FOx 3y (<p(x, y)A V ~(y)). There-
fore ~l F V o-d Ox 3y ( <p(x, y 1\(T(y)) since a countable union of countable sets is 
countable. Hence for some u E ~(y), ~FOx 3y (<p(x, y)A u(y)), and thus the 
sentence is consistent with T. Therefore T 0-locally implies ~ (y ). 0 
Remark. If $ 8 = L 8 (::1) for some countable fragment B, then any set of formulas 
~(x) in x is a $ 5 -type. The verification that a theory T strongly implies ~ shows 
that T 0-locally implies~- If Tis a complete theory, then by the 0-omitting Types 
Theorem and Theorem 3.6, T 0-locally implies ~ iff T has a standard model that 
satisfies 'r/x V ~(x). Keisler [10] shows the same result holds when "0-locally 
implies" is replaced by "strongly implies." Hence for a complete theory T, 
T 0-locally implies ~ iff T strongly implies ~-
One important feature of our new 0-0mitting Types Theorem is that we can 
"relativize" the result to sets of formulas of LA(::!) with low quantifier complexity. 
If $ is the set of basic formulas of L, Corollary 3.5 gives us the following Basic 
0-0mitting Types Theorem which will be important in applications. 
Definition. We say that~ is a standard-generic model generated from T if~ is an 
(M, $)-standard-generic model for M =Mod (T) and $ the set of all basic 
formulas of L. 
Corollary 3.7. (to Theorem 3.4). (Basic 0-0mitting Types Theorem) LetT be a 
consistent theory of LA(::!) that contains axioms (A6) and (A9) for all 0-primitive 
formulas, and let 8(x) be a set of a-primitive formulas of LA(::!). Suppose that for 
every 0-primitive sentence Ow 3x ljl( w, x) that is consistent with T there is a 
O(x)E8(x) such that Ow3x(!{l(w,x)AO(x)) is consistent with T. Then every 
standard- generic model generated from T satisfies 'r/x V 8(x ). 0 
258 K.B. Bruce 
Unfortunately it is often difficult to verify the hypotheses of the 0-0mitting 
Types Theorem in practice. Therefore we will now look at some equivalent or 
weaker versions of this theorem. Our next theorem deals with the special case 
when the type @(x) contains a formula 8(x) such that TI=Ox 8(x). 
Theorem 3.8. Let T be an V V cPs theory and B(x) a cPs -type in one variable. 
Assume that: 
(i) there is a 80 E @(x) such that TI=Ox 80 (x), and 
(ii) for all formulas 3x cp(x) E cPs that are consistent with T, there exists a 
8EB(x) such that 3x (cp(x)A8(x)) is consistent with T. 
Then T 0-locally implies @(x) and hence T has a standard model which satisfies 
VxV @(x). 
Proof. This proof is a generalization of the proof of Theorem 2.10. Suppose 
Oy 3x cp(x, y) is a sentence in cPs that is consistent with T. We need to show there 
is a 8(x)E@(x) such that Oy3x(cp(x,y)A8(x)) is consistent with T. If 
Oy 3x ( cp(x, y) 1\ 80 (x )) is consistent then we are done. If not, then Oy 3x ( cp(x, y) 1\ 
180 (x)) is consistent. By repeated use of (A4) we can show 
l-Oy 3x (cp(x, y) 1\ 180 (x)) ~ 3x Oy (cp, y) 1\ 180 (x)) 
vOx 3y (cp(x, y)A180 (x)). 
However, the second disjunct cannot be consistent with T since it implies 
Ox-,80 (x), contradicting hypothesis (i) of the theorem. Therefore 3x Oy (cp(x, y)A 
180 (x)), and hence 3x Oy cp(x, y ), is consistent with T. By hypothesis (ii) there is a 
8E@ such that 3x(Oycp(x,y)A8(x)) is consistent. Therefore 3x0y(cp(x,y)A 
8(x)), and hence Oy 3x (cp(x, y)A 8(x)), is consistent with T. 
Thus T 0-locally implies @(x) and T has a standard model that satisfies 
Vx V fJ(x). 0 
Note that hypothesis (ii) of the above theorem is just the statement that T 
locally implies @(x). Of course many of the types we are interested in do not 
contain a formula 80 such that TI=Ox 80 (x). Therefore the next theorem gives 
another formulation of the 0-0mitting Types Theorem in terms of the existence 
of countable chains of models. For many algebraic applications, this formulation 
may be the easiest to apply. 
Definition. We say that a cPs-elementary chai; (~n• fn), n < w, of ideal models is 
cPs -precise iff for each n < w and each formula t/1( y) E cPs with constants from An, 
(~{!, fn)F ::Jy t/J(y) iff {bE An+l: (~l!+l, fn+l)F t/J(b)} £An" 
(Note that we do not require the models, (~n' fn), to be cPs-good.) 
Both Theorem 3.8 and the following theorem originally appeared in Keisler 
[10] for the case cP = L(::l). 
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Theorem 3.9. Let T be a countable consistent set of V V <Ps sentences and ! (y) a 
<Ps -type. Then the following condition is necessary and sufficient forT to 0-locally 
!(y). 
For every sentence Ox 3y cp(x, y) that is consistent with T, there exists a <P5 -
precise elementary chain (2lm fn), n < w, of countable ideal models of 
T U {Ox 3y cp(x, y )}, each of which satisfies Vy V !(y ). 
Proof. ( =?) By the proof of Theorem 3.4, if T 0-locally omits !(y) and 
Ox 3y cp(x, y) is consistent with T there is a $ 5 -precise elementary chain of length 
w 1, each of whose members satisfies Vy V !(y). 
( ¢::) We will show T 0-locally implies !(y ). Suppose the sentence 
Ox 3y cp(x, y) E $ 5 is consistent with T. Then by hypothesis there is a <P5 -precise 
elementary chain (2ln, fn), for n < w, of countable ideal models of 
T u {Ox 3y cp(x, y )}. If X= XI .•. xm, then since the chain is <Ps-precise there is a 
sequence b = b1 • • • bm such that bP E AP \Ap-l for each 1 ~ p ~ m, and (2!:!,, fm)F 
3y cp(b, y ). Since (~!,, fm)I=Vy V !(y ), there is a <T(y) E !(y) such that (~!,, fm)F 
3y (cp(b, y)A<T(y)). Reversing the process we get (~0 , f0 )1=0x 3y (cp(x, y)A<T(y)). 
Hence T 0-locally implies !(y ). 
By a theorem of Keisler (Theorem 3.5.3 of [10]) relativized to <P5 , (2!:0 , f0 ) is a 
<Ps -good ideal model. Therefore T has' a <Ps -good ideal model and 0-locally 
implies !(y ). D 
We would now like to give an application of the Basic Omitting Types 
Theorem. Many of the applications of the completeness and compactness 
theorems of L(.:::l) have involved non-standard interpretations of the new quan-
tifiers .:::lx and Ox. For example if ~l =<A, E) is a countable model of ZF and 
f ={X: there is a yEA such that for all z E A(z EX~ zEy )}, then it can be shown 
using the axiom of replacement that (~l, f) satisfies all of the axioms of L(.:::l1). (The 
only difficult axiom is Vy .:::lx cp 1\ .:::ly 3x cp ~ .::lx 3y cp, but with a little work it can be 
seen that this is a restatement of replacement.) The methods developed in this 
paper emphasize the fine control obtained by looking at the structure of the 
quantifier prefixes of formulas. Therefore rather than presenting examples from 
set theory with its abundance of quantifiers, we will examine theories of ordered 
fields. The following is an application of Theorem 3.9. 
Definition. We say that <F, 0, 1, +,., >) is an ordered field if <F, 0, 1, +,. ,) is a 
field, <F, >) is a totally ordered set, and for all a, b, c E F, 
(i) if a > b then a + c > b + c, and 
(ii) if a> b and c > 0, then ac >be. 
We say that the ordered field <F. 0, 1, +, >) is Archimedian ordered if for all 
a E F such that a> 0 there is a finite natural number n such that a< n. 
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For example, the ordered field of the real numbers is Archimedian ordered but 
any non-standard model of the reals is not Archimedian ordered since it must 
contain infinite non-standard reals. 
In studying ordered fields we are often concerned with the question of when a 
finite system of equations and inequalities has a solution in the field. For this 
application we will be concerned with slightly more than this. Our strategy in what 
follows will be to Jet the quantifier Ox have the non-standard interpretation 
"there is a non-empty interval of x's such that .... " We will abbreviate this as Ix. 
Therefore if F is an ordered field, Fl= Ix <p(x) iff there exist a, bE F such that a< b 
and for all c E F such that a< c < b, FF <p[c]. 
Definition. An interval system E(x) is a formula of the form (Sy)A<n P;(X, y) 
where each g (x, y) is an equation or inequality between polynomials (i.e., the 
relation involved is <, >, ==, :1:., >,or t=) and Sy is a finite string of ly's and 
3y/s. 
Definition. A tower of ordered fields {F n : n < w} is said to be basically precise iff 
for each n < w, each interval system E (x, y ), and each b from F n: 
(i) For each aEFn,Fni=E[a,b] if and only if Fn+ 1 FE[a,b], 
(ii) There is a non-empty interval of solutions of E(x, b) in F n if and only if for 
some bEFn+ 1\Fn,b is a solution of E(x,b) in Fn+I· 
The following theorem characterizes the theories (of certain quantifier complex-
ity) of ordered fields that have a model which is an uncountable Archimedian 
ordered field. 
Theorem 3.10. Let T be a theory, each of whose axioms is of the form 
Vx Vi<n E;(x) where each E;(x) is an interval system, and letT contain the axioms 
of ordered fields. Suppose there is a basically precise tower of Archimedian ordered 
fields, F n' n < w, each of which satisfies T. Then T has a model which is an 
Archimedian ordered field of cardinality w 1 • 
Proof. Let @(y) = {y < ii: nEw}. We will produce a theory T* 2 T which satisfies 
the conditions of Theorem 3.9 for @(y ), and hence 0-Jocally implies @(y ). Then 
by the Basic 0-0mitting Types Theorem, T* (and thus T) will have an uncounta-
ble model that satisfies Vy V @(y) and therefore is Archimedian ordered. 
Let T*=TU{<pELA(:::I):<p is a a-primitive sentence or the negation of a 
0-primitive sentence, and F0 F 'P }. By (i) in the definition of basically precise 
tower, F n I= T* for each n < w. We must show that for every 0-primitive sentence 'P 
that is consistent with T* there is a basically precise tower of models of T* U { 'P}, 
each of which is Archimedian ordered. However, by our definition of T*, 'P is 
consistent with T* iff 'P E T*. Therefore the basically precise tower' F n' n < w, 
given in the hypothesis for the theorem suffices for each case. 0 
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In the above theorem since we are using the non-standard interpretation of Ox 
as "there is a non-empty interval of x's such that ... ," each uncountable set of 
the model that is definable by a 0-primitive formula must contain a non-empty 
interval of the model. 
4. Forcing companions in LA(:::J) 
Let T be a consistent set of sentences of LA(:::J) and let (/> be any fixed set of 
formulas of LA(:::.l) that contains all basic formulas of L and is closed under 
subformulas. We now wish to investigate P(M, $) and the forcing relation more 
closely for M =Mod (T). Recall that Mod (T) = {('2!, f): ('2!, f) is a $ 5 -good ideal 
model ofT}. We abbreviate P(M, $) by P(T). 
Definition. If Tis a set of sentences of LA(:::.l), we define Tf to be {cp E LA(:::.l): 011- w cp 
with respect to the forcing property P(T)}. Tf is called the forcing companion ofT. 
We will be interested in studying the relation between theories and their forcing 
companions. 
Definition. If Tis a set of sentences of LA(:::.l) we define T,5 to be {-,cp:TI=-,cp 
and cp is a sentence in $ 5 }. 
The following theorem shows that the forcing companion of a theory T depends 
only on the consequences of T that are of low complexity. 
Theorem 4.1. If T is a theory of LA(:::J), then P(T) = P(T,5 ), and therefore Tf = 
(T,s)f. 
Proof. Suppose p E P(T). Therefore Ox 3y 1\p(x, y) is consistent with T. Since 
Tl= T , 5 it follows that Ox 3y 1\p (x, y) is consistent with T , 5 , and hence that 
p E P(T,5 ). 
Suppose pE P(T). Therefore TI=-,Ox 3y 1\p(x, y ). But Ox 3y 1\p(x, y) is equival-
ent to a formula of $ 5 . Thus T,5 1=-,0x3y/\p(x,y) and hence pEP(T,5 ). 
We show Tf = (T ,s)f as follows. Recall that cp E Tf iff Ol=w cp in P(T). But since 
P(T) = P(T _5 ), 0 11-w cp in P(T) iff 0 11-w cp in P(T_5 ) iff cp E (T _5 )f. Therefore cp E Tf iff 
cp E (T,5 )f. D 
We say that a theory T is forcing complete if Tf = T. The following theorem 
shows that the forcing companion of a theory is itself forcing-complete. 
Theorem 4.2. T , 5 = (T' ),5 and therefore (Tf)f = (T , 5 )f = Tf. 
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Proof. Let <p be a sentence of @5 . Then the following are equivalent: 
(1) h <p) e (Tf),5 . 
(2) There is a p E P(T) such that p II- <p. 
(3) {<p}E P(T). 
( 4) T U { <p} is consistent. 
(5) (1<p)ET,5 . 
Therefore T , 5 = (Tf),5 . To show the last remark we note that (Tf)f = ((Tf)-,5 )f by 
Theorem 4.1. By the first part of this theorem (Tf),5 = T , 5 , so (Tf)f = (T , 5 )f. 
Again by Theorem 4.1, (T , 5 )f = Tf so (Tf)f = Tf. 0 
Now that we know which formulas of a theory are relevant for the definition of 
forcing properties we would like to investigate which formulas of T are preserved 
in generic models. In other words, for which <p i_s it true that Tl= <p implies <p holds 
in every P-generic model generated from P(T)? The following corollary of the 
0-0mitting Types Theorem gives us a starting place for our study. 
Corollary 4.3. If the sentence <p E LA(~) is of the form Vw V !( w) where!( w) is a 
finite or countably infinite set of formulas of @5 , and if Tl= <p, then <p holds in every 
~-generic model generated from P(T), and in fact holds in every standard-generic 
model generated from P(T). 
Proof. As in the proof of the 0-0mitting Types Theorem one can show that T 
0-locally implies !( w ). Hence every ~-generic and standard-generic model 
satisfies Vw V !(w). 0 
Therefore we can summarize our information on which formulas are preserved 
under forcing in the following: 
Corollary 4.4. If <p E LA(~) is of the form: 
(i) V w V! ( w) where ! ( w) is a finite or countably infinite set of sentences of @5 , 
or 
(ii) 1 t{.l for t{.l E @5, 
and Tl= <p, then <p holds in every ~-generic and standard- generic model generated 
from P(T). 
Proof. Case (i) is just Corollary 4.3. For Case (ii), Theorem 4.2 states that Tl=1 t{.l 
iff Ol=w 11ji, so 1 t{.l is preserved under ~-generic models. It is also preserved under 
standard-generic models since 1 t{.l is preserved under unions of @5 -elementary 
chains. 0 
The following results seem to hold only for the preservation of formulas under 
the construction of ~-generic models and not standard-generic models. The proofs 
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seem to break down for the limit of a chain of ~-generic models. However, these 
results may have relevance for other interpretations of ~x. We begin by recalling 
that Qxcp abbreviates ~Xicp and 1--,Qx-,cp ~ 6.x cp. 
The definition of p II- 6.x cp(x) has the following very simple form. 
Proposition 4.5. pii-Oxcp(x) iff'v'd>ppll-wcp(d). 
Proof. p II- Ox cp(x) iff p II- ~x 1 cp(x) iff 'v' d > p pF11 cp(d) iff 'v' d > p p 11-w cp(d). 
Note. Much of this paper could be reformulated by taking 6.x as the basic 
quantifier (instead of ~x ), and defining p II- Ox iff 'v' d > p p 11-w cp(d). One advantage 
of 6. is that 
1-0xl ... 6.xncp(xl, ... 'xn) ~ -,Qxl ... Qxn icp(xb ... 'xJ, 
whereas there is no nice equivalent to ~x1 • • • ~xncp(xb ... , xn) in terms of Q's. 
However, there were two basic reasons for choosing ~x over 6.x. The first is that 
the definition of forcing for ~x is less complex than for 6.x (two quantifiers versus 
three for Ox). The second reason is that ~x seems to be more basic to the 
construction of standard models. In the construction of standard models we 
prevent the growth of s"''s for which (~, f)F~xcp(x). This problem of preventing 
growth is the key to the entire construction. Also, pedagogically "~x" suggests 
"few" in the same way that "3x" suggests "exists" and "'v'x" suggests "all." 
The following theorem sharpens up the Q-Omitting Types Theorem, although 
properly speaking, this theorem no longer talks about omitting a type. 
Theorem 4.6. Let Qz 'v'w V EJ(z, w) be a sentence of LA(~) where EJ(z, w) £ cPs, 
and let M be a class of cPs-good ideal models. Suppose that for all sentences 
Qx 3w l{!(x, w) E cPs that are satisfiable in M and such that z is a subsequence of x 
(in the same order), there is a O(z, w) E EJ(z, w) such that Ox 3w (l{!(x, w) 1\fJ(z, w )) 
is satisfiable in M. Then Qz 'v'w V EJ(z, w) holds in every (M, $)-generic model. 
Proof. We give the proof for z = z 1 z2 • The general case is similar. Let 
p(d,c)EP(M,cP). Pick dbd2 ED such that d2 >vd1 and pick c1, ... ,c,.EC 
where n is the length of w. Then 
p' = p (d, c) U { d 1 ""=' d 1, d2 """' d2} U { C; ""=' C; : 1 ~ i ~ n} E P(M, cP) 
since Qx(x """'x) is valid. By the definition of P(M, cP), Ox 3w 3w' 1\p'(x, w, w') is 
satisfiable in M. In the preceding formula z 1 and z2 are elements of the sequence 
x with z1 appearing before z2 . By the hypothesis of the theorem there is a 
O(z, w) E EJ(z, w) such that Ox 3w (3w' 1\p'(x, w, w') 1\ O(z, w )) is satisfiable in M. 
Therefore by the definition of P(M, cP), we have for all p E P(M, cP), all d 1 ED, all 
d2 > v db and all c' = c1 · • • c,., there is a (J such that 
p(d, c) U { 9(d1, d2 , c')} E P(M, cP). 
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By Lemma 2.7 it follows that for all d1 ED, all d2 >0 d1 , all pEP(M, IP), and all 
c' from C, there exists a q;;.; p such that q II- V EJ(db dz, c'). Hence for all d1 ED, 
and all d2 >vd1, 011-Vw V EJ(db d2 , w). Therefore if for each p E P(M, IP) we let 
q = p U {d1 = d1}, then for all d2 > q, q 11-Vw V EJ(db d2 , w) and thus q 11-
wvw V EJ(d1, d2 , w). By Proposition 4.5 it follows that for all d1 ED and all 
p E P(M, IP) there is a q;;.; p such that q II-Oz2 Vw V 0(d1 , z2 , w ). Therefore for all 
d1 ED, 011-w Oz2 Vw V 0(d1, z2 , w) and hence 0 II-Oz1 Oz2 Vw V 0(z1 , z2 , w). By 
Corollary 2.4 this sentence will hold in every (M, IP)-generic model. 0 
As before the hypotheses of this theorem are preserved under generic exten-
sions. 
Lemma 4.7. Let M and IPs satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 4.6. Then if(~, f) is 
an (M, IP)-generic model, M' and IP' satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 4.6 where 
M' = {(~l, f)} and IP' = IP(A). 
Proof. The proof is just like that of Lemma 3.3 and is omitted. 0 
Unfortunately although the hypotheses of Theorem 4.6 are preserved at the 
limit stages of the construction of the standard-generic models, it seems impossi-
ble to make sure that the Oz 's will have their intended meaning in the final model 
and hence be preserved at the final stage. 
We do obtain the following corollary to Theorem 4.6 for ::l-generic models. 
Corollary 4.8. If TI=Oz Vw V !(z, w) for !(z, w) <;;IPs and Oz Vw V !(z, w) is a 
sentence of LA(::l), then Oz Vw V !(z, w) holds in all ::l-generic models generated 
from P(T). 
Proof. We will apply Theorem 4.6 with M =Mod (T). Suppose 
TU{Ox 3w l/f(x, w)} is consistent for Ox 3w l/f(x, w)E IPs and z a subsequence of x 
(in the same order). To apply Theorem 4.6 we need to show there is a a E! such 
that Ox 3w (l/f(x, w)A a(z, w)) is consistent with T. 
Suppose not. Therefore for all aE!, TI=-,Ox 3w (l/J(x, w)Aa(z, w)). Therefore 
TI=-,V"EI Ox 3w (l/J(x, w)Aa(z, w)), 
and hence 
TI=-,Ox3w (l/f(x, w)A V !(z, w)). 
However, TI=Oz Vw V !(z, w) so 
TI=-,Ox 3w (l/J(x, w)A V !(z, w))A-,0x3w-, V !(z, w). 
Therefore TI=-,Ox 3w ((l/JA V !)v 1 V !) and so TI=-,Ox 3w l/f(x, w). However, 
by assumption T U mx 3w ~~(x, w)} is consistent. This contradiction shows 
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T U {Ox 3w ( 1/f(x, w) 1\ u(z, w))} is consistent for some u E !. Therefore by Theorem 
4.6, Qz Vw V 0(z, w) holds for all ::!-generic models generated from P(T). D 
As we remarked above, this theorem does not seem to hold for standard-
generic models. 
Added in proof. Kaufmann has recently shown that the associated omitting types 
theorem does hold for standard models of L (::1). 
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